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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Article VIII, §3 of the Utah Constitution, 
Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2 (1953 as amended), and Rule 3 ( a ) , 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a final judgment entered by the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Third Judicial District Court of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in favor of U.S. Life Title 
Insurance Company of Dallas ("U.S. Title") and dismissing 
Valley Bank and Trust Company's ("Valley Bank") complaint with 
prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The following issues are presented for review in this 
case: 
1 • Whether the District Court erred in concluding 
that Valley Bank "created" a prior recorded, but undisclosed 
lien within the meaning and intent of an exclusion for defects 
created by the insured contained in a Mortgagee Policy of Title 
Insurance issued by U.S. Title to Valley Bank, despite the fact 
that U.S. Title knew about the prior recorded lien, but failed 
to list it as an exception to coverage. 
2 . W h e t h e r the D i s t r i c t Court erred in c o n c l u d i n g 
that a M o r t g a g e e Policy of Title I n s u r a n c e e x c l u s i o n for 
defects created by the insured is effective to exclude coverage 
for the prior recorded lien under the facts of this case. 
3. W h e t h e r the D i s t r i c t Court erred in c o n c l u d i n g 
that U.S. Title is not liable under the M o r t g a g e e Policy of 
Title Insurance it issued to Valley Bank for losses incurred by 
Valley Bank as a result of the existence of a prior r e c o r d e d , 
b u t u n d i s c 1 o s e d 1 i e n . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This is an action by Valley Bank to recover the loss 
it incurred b e c a u s e of U . S . T i t l e ' s f a i l u r e to list a prior 
recorded lien as an e x c e p t i o n to c o v e r a g e under a Mortgagee 
Policy of Title Insurance (the "Policy") issued by U . S . T i t l e 
to Valley Bank insuring the priority of a trust deed held by 
Valley B a n k . U . S . T i t l e denies c o v e r a g e , a s s e r t i n g that 
c o v e r a g e is excepted because of a policy exclusion for defects 
or encumbrances created by the insured. 
2. Course of Proceedings 
On April 2 , 1 9 8 6 , Valley Bank filed an action in the 
Third Judicial D i s t r i c t Court in and for Salt Lake C o u n t y , 
State of U t a h , against U.S. Title to recover damages caused by 
U.S. Title's failure to insure the trust deed given to Valley 
Bank on certain real property. (Record on Appeal, Val1ey Bank 
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and T r u s t C o m p a n y v. U . S . Life T i t l e I n s u r a n c e C o m p a n y of 
Dal l a s , Civil M o . C 8 6 - 2 3 7 9 ( h e r e a f t e r " R . " ) , p . 2 ) . Valley 
Bank filed a m o t i o n for partial s u m m a r y j u d g m e n t on July 3, 
1 9 8 6 , on the i s s u e of w h e t h e r the e x c l u s i o n a r y p r o v i s i o n 
c o n t a i n e d in p a r a g r a p h 3 of the " E x c l u s i o n s From C o v e r a g e " 
section of the Policy was enforceable. (R. 3 1 ) . On A u g u s t 4, 
1986, U . S . Title filed a motion for summary judgment, which was 
heard, together with Valley Bank's m o t i o n for partial s u m m a r y 
j u d g m e n t , by the H o n o r a b l e H o m e r F. W i l k i n s o n on August 15, 
1986. (R. 6 4 ) . Both motions were denied. Id. 
A trial was held b e f o r e the H o n o r a b l e H o m e r F. 
W i l k i n s o n on May 1 4 , 1 9 8 7 , at w h i c h t i m e the J u d g e g r a n t e d 
j u d g m e n t in favor of U . S . Title. (R. 9 5 ) . In his findings of 
fact and conclusions of law filed on July 7, 1987, J u d g e H o m e r 
F. W i l k i n s o n c o n c l u d e d that Valley Bank's complaint should be 
dismissed with p r e j u d i c e upon the m e r i t s . (R. 1 0 7 ) . V a l l e y 
Bank m o v e d for a new trial pursuant to Rule 5 9 ( a ) , Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, on July 1 0 , 1 9 8 7 , (R. 1 1 7 ) , w h i c h m o t i o n 
was d e n i e d by an O r d e r e n t e r e d on S e p t e m b e r 2, 1 9 8 7 . (R. 
1 2 9 - 3 0 ) . V a l l e y Bank filed a N o t i c e of Appeal to the Utah 
Supreme Court on September 24, 1987. (R. 1 3 1 ) . 
3. Statement of Facts 
a. Identification of the Parties 
V a l l e y Bank is a b a n k i n g c o r p o r a t i o n i n c o r p o r a t e d 
under the laws of the S t a t e of U t a h . It is a w h o l l y owned 
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s u b s i d i a r y of V a l l e y U t a h B a n c o r p o r a t i o n , a Utah corporation, 
and is a s e p a r a t e and d i s t i n c t e n t i t y from V a l l e y M o r t g a g e 
C o r p o r a t i o n ("Valley M o r t g a g e " ) . (Transcript of the May 14, 
1987, trial of Valley Bank and Trust Company v. U.S. Life Title 
I n s u r a n c e C o m p a n y of D a l l a s , Civil N o . C 8 6 - 2 3 7 9 ( h e r e a f t e r 
" T r . " ) , p. 3, 8) . 
V a l l e y M o r t g a g e is also a wholly owned subsidiary of 
V a l l e y Utah B a n c o r p o r a t i o n . J_d. As a Utah c o r p o r a t i o n , 
V a l l e y M o r t g a g e was and is in the b u s i n e s s of o r i g i n a t i n g 
mortgage l o a n s . (Tr. 1 8 ) . A f t e r V a l l e y M o r t g a g e o r i g i n a t e d 
such l o a n s , V a l l e y Bank t y p i c a l l y closed the loans on Valley 
Bank d o c u m e n t a t i o n . _I_d. There has never been any suggestion 
or allegation in this case that Valley Bank and Valley Mortgage 
are the alter egos of each o t h e r . 
U . S . Title is a Texas corporation incorporated for the 
purpose of underwriting and i s s u i n g p o l i c i e s of t i t l e i n s u r -
a n c e . One of its agents in the state of Utah is Mountain View 
Title Company of Ogden, Utah ("Mountain V i e w " ) . 
b• Small B u s i n e s s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' s Grant of the SBA 
Loan in Early A p r i l , 1983 
In A p r i l , 1 9 8 3 , V a l l e y B a n k , t h r o u g h its Small 
Business Administration Department ("SBA D e p a r t m e n t " ) , m a d e a 
loan (the "SBA L o a n " ) to F. Kent N a n c e and Patricia J. Nance 
(the "Nances") in the principal sum of $ 6 5 , 0 0 0 . (R. 1 0 4 ) . The 
SBA L o a n was s e c u r e d by a t r u s t deed (the ".SBA Trust Deed") 
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a g a i n s t c e r t a i n real p r o p e r t y (the " P r o p e r t y " ) owned by the 
Nances in Summit C o u n t y , U t a h . (R. 1 0 4 ; E x h i b i t ( h e r e a f t e r 
" E x . " ) 6 ) . The SBA Trust Deed was recorded in the office of 
the Summit County Recorder on April 5, 1983. (R. 105; Ex. 6 ) . 
c. Valley Mortgage's Grant of the Residential Loan in 
Late April , 1983 
A p p r o x i m a t e l y t h r e e w e e k s after Valley Bank made the 
SBA Loan to the N a n c e s , the Nances a p p r o a c h e d V a l l e y M o r t g a g e 
for the p u r p o s e of o b t a i n i n g an a d d i t i o n a l l o a n . The Nances 
e x e c u t e d and d e l i v e r e d to V a l l e y M o r t g a g e a V a l l e y Bank 
p r o m i s s o r y note in the p r i n c i p a l sum of $101,500 (the "Resi-
dential L o a n " ) . (R. 1 0 4 ) . The Residential Loan was secured by 
a trust deed (the "Residential Trust Deed") against the Nances' 
P r o p e r t y , (R. 1 0 4 ) , and was r e c o r d e d in the o f f i c e of the 
Summit County Recorder on April 26, 1983. (R. 104; Ex. 1 ) . 
To determine the existence of other loans p r o c u r e d by 
its b o r r o w e r s , V a l l e y M o r t g a g e did not customarily perform a 
physical search of its own files or of V a l l e y B a n k ' s f i l e s . 
( T r . 4 4 - 4 5 ) . A d d i t i o n a l l y , V a l l e y M o r t g a g e did not have a 
c o m p u t e r i n d e x i n g s y s t e m with w h i c h to s e a r c h for p r e v i o u s 
l o a n s e x t e n d e d to b o r r o w e r s . ( T r . 4 5 ) . I n s t e a d , V a l l e y 
Mortgage typically relied on the b o r r o w e r ' s loan a p p l i c a t i o n , 
r o u t i n e c r e d i t c h e c k s , preliminary title reports and policies 
of title insurance to ascertain the existence of p r i o r s e c u r e d 
loans. Id. 
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During the time the Nances applied for and obtained 
the Residential Loan, they did not disclose the existence of 
the earlier SBA Trust Deed to either Valley Mortgage or to 
Valley Bank. (Tr. 21, 22; Ex. 17). At the time the Residential 
Loan closed, Valley Mortgage's loan officer in charge of the 
Residential Loan, Paul Thurston ("Thurston"), was unaware of 
the existence of the SBA Loan. (R. 105). Furthermore, Thurston 
never discussed with any representative of Valley Bank the 
existence of other loans which the Nances might have had with 
Valley Bank. (Tr. 36-37, 40) . 
d. Valley Mortgage's Procuring of the Commitment of 
Title Insurance 
As a condition to closing the Residential Loan and in 
order to determine all liens or encumbrances which might have 
existed against the Property, Valley Mortgage requested a title 
report from U.S. Title's agent, Mountain View. (Tr. 2 2 ) . On 
April 15, 1983, U.S. Title issued a Commitment of Title 
Insurance (the "Commitment") to Valley Bank. (Tr. 24; Ex. 2 ) . 
The Commitment listed as exceptions to coverage liens held by 
First Security Bank of Utah and Citizens Bank. (Tr. 26; Ex. 2 ) . 
The Commitment did not disclose the existence of the SBA Trust 
Deed previously recorded on April 5, 1983. Id. 
In connection with the closing of the Residential 
Loan, Valley Mortgage issued written closing instructions to 
Mountain View directing Mountain View to "[s]earch title to 
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d a t e and r e c o r d above documen ts p r o v i d i n g n o t h i n g has been 
f i l e d o r r e c o r d e d a f f e c t i n g s u b j e c t p r o p e r t y s i n c e l a s t 
c e r t i f i c a t e d a t e . " ( T r . 3 2 , 3 3 ; E x . 1 5 ) . R e m a r k a b l y , 
Moun ta in View reco rded t h e R e s i d e n t i a l T r u s t Deed d e s p i t e t h e 
f a c t t h a t t h e SBA T r u s t Deed had been of r e c o r d f o r some t h r e e 
w e e k s . ( E x . 1 ) . 
e . U.S. T i t l e ' s I ssuance of t he P o l i c y . 
Three months l a t e r , i n J u l y , 1983, U.S. T i t l e i ssued a 
Mor tgage P o l i c y of T i t l e I n s u r a n c e t o V a l l e y Bank, i n s u r i n g t h e 
R e s i d e n t i a l T r u s t Deed as a f i r s t and paramount l i e n a g a i n s t 
t he P r o p e r t y . (R. 104; Ex. 3 ) . The P o l i c y made no m e n t i o n o f 
t he SBA T r u s t Deed as an e x c e p t i o n t o c o v e r a g e . I d . 
P r i o r t o i s s u i n g t h e P o l i c y , M o u n t a i n V iew, t h r o u g h 
i t s p r e s i d e n t , Michae l L . Hendry ( " H e n d r y " ) , a c q u i r e d a c t u a l 
k n o w l e d g e o f t h e e x i s t e n c e o f t h e SBA T r u s t Deed. (R. 105; 
T r . 132 , 1 3 4 ) . M o u n t a i n V iew may have been aware o f t h e SBA 
T r u s t Deed t h r o u g h a v i c e p r e s i d e n t , K e v i n N. P a r k i n s o n , as 
e a r l y as A p r i l 26 , 1983, t h e d a t e t h e R e s i d e n t i a l T r u s t Deed 
was r e c o r d e d ( T r . 120 , 1 2 1 - 2 2 , 1 2 7 - 2 8 , 146 , 1 4 9 - 5 0 ) . Mounta in 
View d i d n o t , however , c o m m u n i c a t e t h a t k n o w l e d g e t o V a l l e y 
Mor tgage b e f o r e i s s u i n g t h e P o l i c y . ( T r . 134 , 138, 1 6 0 - 6 1 ) . 
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f. Valley Mortgage's Sale of the Residential Loan and 
R e s i d e n t i a l Loan Trust Deed in the S e c o n d a r y 
Mortgage Market 
After originating a loan, Valley Mortgage commonly, if 
not a l w a y s , sold the loan in the s e c o n d a r y m o r t g a g e m a r k e t . 
( T r . 2 3 ) . In t h i s c a s e , Valley Mortgage sold the Residential 
Loan and Trust Deed to Federal Home Loan M o r t g a g e C o r p o r a t i o n 
("Federal H o m e " ) . (R. 104; Ex. 5 ) . Prior to the sale, Valley 
Bank assigned the Residential Trust Deed to Valley Mortgage and 
V a l l e y M o r t g a g e assigned the Trust Deed to Federal Home. (Tr. 
38; Ex. 4, 5 ) . In c o n n e c t i o n with both a s s i g n m e n t s , V a l l e y 
Bank and V a l l e y M o r t g a g e warranted that the Residential Trust 
Deed was a first lien on the Property. (R. 2 ) . 
In its i n s t r u c t i o n l e t t e r to Mountain View governing 
r e c o r d a t i o n of the R e s i d e n t i a l T r u s t D e e d , V a l l e y M o r t g a g e 
specifically requested an indorsement on the Policy so that the 
transferee of the R e s i d e n t i a l Loan and T r u s t D e e d , F e d e r a l 
H o m e , c o u l d be named as an insured. (R. 104; Tr. 3 7 ) . At the 
time Mountain View received Valley Mortgage's closing i n s t r u c -
t i o n s , M o u n t a i n V i e w , t h r o u g h its p r e s i d e n t , Hendry, knew of 
Valley Mortgage's assignment of the Residential Loan and T r u s t 
D e e d . ( T r . 1 3 5 - 3 6 , 1 3 7 ) . Though Hendry knew of the assignment 
to Federal H o m e and of the e a r l i e r r e c o r d e d SBA T r u s t D e e d , 
H e n d r y f a i l e d to d i s c l o s e the existence of the SBA Trust Deed 
to Federal Home. (Tr. 1 3 6 ) . 
- 8 -
g. Valley Bank's Repurchase of the Residential Loan. 
In early 1 9 8 4 , the N a n c e s d e f a u l t e d on both the SBA 
and Residential Loans. (R. 1 0 5 ) . The Nances also defaulted on 
a loan m a d e to them by I n t e r m o u n t a i n T h r i f t & Loan ("Inter-
m o u n t a i n " ) , (R. 1 0 5 ) , a wholly owned subsidiary of V a l l e y Utah 
B a n c o r p o r a t i o n . (Tr. 7 - 8 ) . After filing a notice of default, 
(Ex. 8 ) , Intermountain sold the Property and an adjacent lot by 
t r u s t e e ' s sale to V a l l e y Bank as the successful bidder. (R. 
1 0 5 - 0 6 ) . 
A f t e r the d e f a u l t , Federal Home also instituted fore-
closure proceedings against the P r o p e r t y . In c o n n e c t i o n with 
the p r o c e e d i n g s , Federal Home obtained a title report pertain-
ing to the Property, from which it learned of the existence of 
the p r i o r r e c o r d e d SBA Trust D e e d . ( T r . 5 4 ) . T h e r e a f t e r , 
Federal Home submitted a claim to U . S . T i t l e , d e m a n d i n g that 
U . S . T i t l e p r o v i d e c o v e r a g e for the SBA Trust D e e d . (Tr. 
54-55; Ex. 2 3 ) . C o n c u r r e n t l y , Federal H o m e and V a l l e y Bank 
e n t e r e d into n e g o t i a t i o n s in an effort to solve the problems 
w h i c h had a r i s e n b e c a u s e of the SBA T r u s t D e e d . ( T r . 5 6 ) . 
Because those negotiations were unsuccessful, Federal Home made 
demand in early 1986 upon V a l l e y B a n k , d e m a n d i n g that V a l l e y 
Bank e i t h e r r e p u r c h a s e the R e s i d e n t i a l Loan or bring it 
c u r r e n t . ( T r . 5 6 ; E x . 1 0 ) . U . S . T i t l e f o r m a l l y d e n i e d 
c o v e r a g e in N o v e m b e r , 1 9 8 5 , ( T r . 6 8 - 6 9 ; E x . 1 1 ) , though the 
t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e s that U . S . T i t l e had v e r b a l l y d e n i e d 
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c o v e r a g e p r i o r to that d a t e . (Tr. 6 9 - 7 1 ) . As a result, Valley 
Bank was forced to repurchase the Residential Loan from Federal 
Home for the sum of $ 1 0 3 , 9 1 2 . 7 8 . (R. 4; Ex. 1 2 ) . Federal Home 
did not complete foreclosure proceedings against the P r o p e r t y . 
(Tr. 5 8 ) . 
h. Terms of the Mortgagee Policy of Title Insurance 
In the case at b a r , U . S . T i t l e issued the Policy to 
Valley Bank, insuring that the R e s i d e n t i a l T r u s t Deed was a 
first and p a r a m o u n t lien a g a i n s t the Property. (R. 104; Ex. 
3 ) . The insuring provision of the Policy provides as follows: 
[The I n s u r e r ] , insures . . . against 
loss or d a m a g e . . . s u s t a i n e d or 
incurred by the insured by reason of: 
2 . Any d e f e c t in or lien or 
encumbrance on such title; 
6. The p r i o r i t y of any lien or 
e n c u m b r a n c e over the lien of the 
insured m o r t g a g e . . . . 
(Ex. 3 ) . 
The P o l i c y also c o n t a i n s a number of exclusions from 
c o v e r a g e . The title policy exclusion w h i c h is at the h e a r t of 
this case provides as follows: 
The f o l l o w i n g m a t t e r s are expressly 
e x c l u d e d from the c o v e r a g e of this 
poli cy : . . . 
D e f e c t s , l i e n s , e n c u m b r a n c e s , 
adverse claims, or o t h e r m a t t e r s 
(a) created, suffered, assumed or 
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agreed to by the insured claim-
ant; . . • 
(Ex. 3, "Exclusions from C o v e r a g e " ) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Argument I 
I n r e v i e w i n g a t r i a l c o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s of l a w , an 
a p p e l l a t e c o u r t shou ld g i v e no d e f e r e n c e to those c o n c l u s i o n s , 
b u t r e v i e w s t h e c o n c l u s i o n s f o r c o r r e c t n e s s . Because V a l l e y 
Bank c h a l l e n g e s o n l y t he D i s t r i c t C o u r t ' s c o n c l u s i o n s o f l a w , 
t h i s c o u r t shou ld rev iew those c o n c l u s i o n s f o r c o r r e c t n e s s . 
2. Argument 11(A) 
As a policy of title insurance, the Policy involved in 
this case is a warranty of the state of title as represented by 
the i n s u r e r . E x c l u s i o n s to the P o l i c y must be c o n s t r u e d 
s t r i c t l y a g a i n s t the i n s u r e r and l i b e r a l l y in favor of the 
insured and must be c o n s t r u e d in a c c o r d a n c e with i m p o r t a n t 
public poli cy . 
3. Argument 11(B) 
Valley Bank's primary contention is that the exclusion 
for defects c r e a t e d by the i n s u r e d , c o n t a i n e d in p a r a g r a p h 
3 ( a ) of the P o l i c y , should be construed to be inapplicable to 
the facts of this c a s e . I n s t e a d , the e x c l u s i o n for d e f e c t s 
c r e a t e d by the in s u r e d should be e n f o r c e d only w h e r e the 
insured has engaged in fraud or m i s c o n d u c t . B e c a u s e t h e r e is 
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no s h o w i n g that Valley Bank acted in bad faith or i n e q u i t a b l y , 
the e x c l u s i o n s h o u l d not a p p l y to d e n y c o v e r a g e for the SBA 
Trust D e e d . 
4. Argument 11(C) 
The e x c l u s i o n should not apply for the further reason 
that U . S . Title had actual knowledge of the prior r e c o r d e d SBA 
Trust Deed at the time it issued the Policy to Valley Bank. Not 
o n l y did U . S . T i t l e fail to list the SBA T r u s t Deed as an 
e x c e p t i o n to c o v e r a g e in the P o l i c y , but it also f a i l e d to 
d i s c l o s e the e x i s t e n c e of the l i e n to V a l l e y B a n k , V a l l e y 
M o r t g a g e or to the a s s i g n e e of the Residential Loan and Trust 
Deed, Federal H o m e . 
5. Argument 11(D) 
T h e fact that neither Valley Mortgage nor Valley Bank 
had actual knowledge of the existence of the prior recorded SBA 
T r u s t D e e d p r o v i d e s a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t for the argument that 
Valley Bank should not be d e e m e d to h a v e " c r e a t e d " the p r i o r 
e n c u m b r a n c e within the meaning and intent of the e x c l u s i o n . As 
i n t e r p r e t e d by c o u r t s , the word " c r e a t e " i m p l i e s that t h e 
i n s u r e d m u s t h a v e a c t u a l k n o w l e d g e of the d e f e c t . B e c a u s e 
neither Valley Mortgage nor Valley Bank had actual knowledge of 
t h e SBA T r u s t D e e d , V a l l e y Bank s h o u l d not be deemed to have 
"created" the SBA Trust Deed. 
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6 . Argument 111 
P u b l i c p o l i c y and p r i n c i p l e s of e q u i t y dictate that 
U . S . Title not be allowed to escape coverage for the SBA T r u s t 
D e e d . W h i l e U . S . T i t l e b r e a c h e d its contractual obligations 
under the Policy by f a i l i n g to list the SBA T r u s t Deed as an 
e x c e p t i o n to coverage and by failing to disclose its existence 
to Valley Bank, Valley Bank complied with its obligations under 
the Policy and was innocent in its dealings with U . S . T i t l e . To 
e n f o r c e the e x c l u s i o n u n d e r the f a c t s of this c a s e , w o u l d 
e n c o u r a g e n e g l i g e n c e and s a n c t i o n w r o n g d o i n g on the part of 
U . S . T i t l e . 
7. Argument IV 
F i n a l l y , U . S . T i t l e is e q u i t a b l y e s t o p p e d from 
asserting the exclusion for defects created by Valley Bank as a 
bar to c o v e r a g e . By issuing the Policy, U . S . Title represented 
that the SBA Trust Deed did not e x i s t . V a l l e y B a n k , in t u r n , 
r e l i e d on the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s made in the Policy in assigning 
t h e R e s i d e n t i a l T r u s t Deed and L o a n to F e d e r a l H o m e , and 
w a r r a n t i n g to Federal Home that the Residential Trust Deed was 
in first p o s i t i o n . As a result of V a l l e y B a n k ' s r e l i a n c e , it 
was l a t e r f o r c e d to r e p u r c h a s e the R e s i d e n t i a l Loan from 
F e d e r a l H o m e , t h e r e b y i n c u r r i n g the l o s s w h i c h it is now 
attempting to recover. 
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ARGUMENT I 
THE SUPREME COURT IS NOT 
REQUIRED TO ACCORD ANY 
DEFERENCE TO THE DISTRICT 
TOURT'S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND REVIEWS THOSE CONCLU-
SIONS FOR CORRECTNESS 
It is a well settled principle of appellate review 
that an appellate court is not required to accord any deference 
to the lower court's conclusions of law. Wessel v. Erickson 
Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250, 253 (Utah 1985). This court has 
consistently held that in reviewing the trial court's legal 
conclusions, the reviewing court reviews the lower court's 
legal conclusions for correctness. Vd.; Scharf v. BMG Corp., 
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
In this appeal, Valley Bank accepts as true each of 
the factual findings adopted by the District Court. See R. 
103-07. Thus, Valley Bank readily endorses the crucial facts 
that at the time Valley Mortgage closed the Residential Loan, 
it did not know of the prior SBA Loan obligation, (R. 105), and 
that at the time the Policy was issued, U.S. Title knew of the 
recorded SBA Trust Deed. (R. 105). 
Valley Bank does, however, challenge the District 
Court's conclusion of law, paragraph "A," that Valley Bank 
"created" the SBA Trust Deed within the meaning of the Policy. 
Valley Bank further challenges the trial court's conclusion of 
law, paragraph "B," that paragraph 3(a) of the Policy is 
effective to exclude the SBA Trust Deed from coverage. Finally, 
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contrary to the District Court's conclusion of law, paragraph 
"C," Valley Bank contends that U.S. Title is liable under the 
Policy for losses incurred by Valley Bank as a result of the 
existence of the SBA Trust Deed. As demonstrated below, the 
District Court misapplied the law governing the circumstances 
under which exclusions for defects created by the insured are 
enforced. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
CONCLUDING THAT VALLEY BANK 
"CREATED" THE SBA TRUST DEED 
WITHIN THE MEANING AND INTENT 
OF THE EXCLUSION FOR DEFECTS 
CREATED BY THE INSURED 
A. The Policy Constitutes an Unequivocal Warranty Against 
Prior Recorded Liens and Encumbrances and Policy Exclusions 
Must be Construed Against U.S. Title 
This court has held in Bush v. Coult, 594 P.2d 865 
(Utah 1979), that title insurance policies are warranties that 
the state of title is as the insurer has represented it to be. 
Bush v. Coul t, 594 P.2d at 867. See also Lawyers Title 
Insurance Corp. v. Research Loan & Investment Corp. 361 F.2d 
764, 767 (8th Cir. 1966). According to the Bush court, "[a] 
title policy is much in the nature of a covenant of warranty or 
a covenant against encumbrances." I_d_. (quoting Empire Develop-
ment Co. v. Title Guaranty and Trust Co., 225 N.Y. 53, 121 N.E. 
468, 470 (1918)). 
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Not only must the P o l i c y be v i e w e d as a warranty of 
title, but exclusions, exceptions, and limitations to i n s u r i n g 
a g r e e m e n t s must be c o n s t r u e d strictly against the insurer and 
liberally in favor of the insured so as to afford the g r e a t e s t 
possible coverage to the insured. National Union Fire Insurance 
C o . of the State of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Reno's Executive Air, 
I n c . , 100 N e v . 360 682 P.2d 1 3 8 0 , 1383 ( N e v . 1 9 8 4 ) ; S a f e c o 
I n s u r a n c e C o . of America v. Davis, 44 Wash. App. 161, 721 P.2d 
5 5 0 , 551 ( 1 9 8 6 ) . In accordance with that rule, paragraph 3(a) 
must be construed broadly so as to afford c o v e r a g e for V a l l e y 
Bank . 
F i n a l l y , p o l i c i e s of t i t l e i n s u r a n c e s h o u l d be 
construed as a whole to give effect to the parties' r e a s o n a b l e 
e x p e c t a t i o n s and must also be c o n s t r u e d in a c c o r d a n c e with 
i m p o r t a n t p u b l i c p o l i c y . S t a n t o n v. Public Employees Mutual 
Insurance Co., 13 Wash. App. 904, 697 P.2d 259, 261 ( 1 9 8 5 ) . As 
d i s c u s s e d b e l o w in A r g u m e n t III, to enforce the exclusion for 
defects created by the insured under the c i r c u m s t a n c e s of t h i s 
c a s e w o u l d be c o n t r a r y to the p u b l i c p o l i c i e s d i s c o u r a g i n g 
n e g l i g e n c e and e n c o u r a g i n g p a r t i e s ' c o m p l i a n c e with t h e i r 
contractual obligations. 
In this c a s e , the District Court failed to appreciate 
the u n c o n d i t i o n a l w a r r a n t y a g a i n s t p r i o r e n c u m b r a n c e s c o n -
t a i n e d in the P o l i c y , to c o n s t r u e the title policy exclusion 
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l i b e r a l l y in f a v o r of V a l l e y Bank and s t r i c t l y against U . S . 
T i t l e , and to i n t e r p r e t the e x c l u s i o n in l i g h t of i m p o r t a n t 
pub!i c poli cy . 
B. In the Absence of Fraud or Misconduct on the Part of Valley 
B a n k , the E x c l u s i o n for D e f e c t s C r e a t e d by the I n s u r e d 
Should Not Apply 
C a s e law i n t e r p r e t i n g e x c l u s i o n s for defects created 
by the insured establishes that such e x c l u s i o n s s h o u l d not be 
e n f o r c e d u n l e s s the i n s u r e d has e n g a g e d in m i s c o n d u c t or 
i n e q u i t a b l e d e a l i n g s . In American Savings and Loan v. Lawyers 
T i t l e I n s u r a n c e C o r p . , 793 F.2d 780 (6th C i r . 1 9 8 6 ) , the 
i n s u r e d , a c o n s t r u c t i o n l e n d e r , l o a n e d $1 million dollars to 
the d e v e l o p e r s of a h o u s i n g c o m p l e x , k n o w i n g that the loan 
might be insufficient to fund the project. To secure the loan, 
the c o n s t r u c t i o n l e n d e r o b t a i n e d a t r u s t deed on the real 
p r o p e r t y . The l e n d e r also acquired from the insurer a policy 
of title insurance, insuring the priority of the trust deed. At 
the t i m e the insurer issued the title policy, the construction 
lender and the insurer w e r e both a w a r e t h a t the c o n s t r u c t i o n 
l e n d e r ' s lien c o u l d b e c o m e s u b o r d i n a t e to m e c h a n i c s 1 l i e n s 
which might subsequently be recorded. 
As a r e s u l t of the difficulties with the construction 
of the housing complex, suppliers filed n o t i c e s of m e c h a n i c s 1 
l i e n s . By o p e r a t i o n of l a w , the m e c h a n i c s ' l i e n s g a i n e d 
priority over the construction lender's l i e n . The c o n s t r u c t i o n 
lender eventually settled the lien claims and demanded recovery 
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f r o m i t s i n s u r e r . A f t e r t h e i n s u r e r ' s r e f u s a l t o pay t h e 
c o n s t r u c t i o n l e n d e r ' s l o s s , t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n l e n d e r b r o u g h t 
s u i t a g a i n s t t he i n s u r e r . 
On a p p e a l , t h e c o u r t c o n s i d e r e d t he i ssue of whether 
t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n l e n d e r , by e x t e n d i n g t h e l o a n d e s p i t e t h e 
c o n s t r u c t i o n l e n d e r ' s k n o w l e d g e t h a t s u b s e q u e n t l y f i l e d 
m e c h a n i c s ' l i e n s would t a k e p r i o r i t y o v e r t h e l e n d e r ' s l i e n , 
" c r e a t e d , s u f f e r e d , assumed or agreed t o " t he mechan i cs ' l i e n s 
wh ich were l a t e r f i l e d . A f t e r d i s c u s s i n g t h e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f 
t he word " c r e a t e d , " t h e c o u r t emphasized t h a t the e x c l u s i o n f o r 
d e f e c t s c r e a t e d by t h e i n s u r e d shou ld be a p p l i e d on l y where t he 
i n s u r e d has engaged i n f r a u d or m i s c o n d u c t . A c c o r d i n g t o the 
c o u r t : 
The c a s e s d i s c u s s i n g the a p p l i c a -
bility of the " c r e a t e d or s u f f e r e d " 
e x c l u s i o n generally have stated that 
the i n s u r e r can e s c a p e l i a b i l i t y 
only if it is e s t a b l i s h e d that the 
d e f e c t , lien or encumbrance resulted 
from s o m e i n t e n t i o n a l m i s c o n d u c t or 
i n e q u i t a b l e d e a l i n g s by the insured 
or the i n s u r e d e i t h e r e x p r e s s l y or 
i m p l i e d l y a s s u m e d or a g r e e d to the 
defects or encumbrances in the course 
of p u r c h a s i n g the property involved. 
The c o u r t s h a v e not p e r m i t t e d the 
i n s u r e r to avoid l i a b i l i t y if the 
i n s u r e d was i n n o c e n t of any conduct 
c a u s i n g the loss or was si m p l y 
n e g l i g e n t in b r i n g i n g a b o u t the 
1 oss . 
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A m e r i c a n S a v i n g s and L o a n , 793 F.2d at 784 (quoting Brown v. 
S t . Paul T i t l e I n s u r a n c e Co., 634 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 n.8 (8th 
Cir. 1980)) (emphasis a d d e d ) . 
The court in American Savings and Loan also emphasized 
that the e n f o r c e m e n t of e x c l u s i o n s for d e f e c t s c r e a t e d by 
i n s u r e d s o f t e n d e p e n d s on equitable c o n s i d e r a t i o n s . Ameri can 
S a v i n g s and L o a n , 793 F.2d at 7 8 4 . The o p i n i o n noted that 
courts are more likely to rule that an insured created a defect 
where the i n s u r e d " b r e a c h e d an o b l i g a t i o n or would d e r i v e a 
w i n d f a l l p r o f i t from r e c o v e r y a g a i n s t its i n s u r e r . " I d. 
B e c a u s e the c o n s t r u c t i o n l e n d e r had p e r f o r m e d each of the 
obligations of its loan a g r e e m e n t , w o u l d not h a v e d e r i v e d a 
windfall profit from an insurance recovery, and had not engaged 
in any w r o n g d o i n g , the court held that the c o n s t r u c t i o n l e n d e r 
would not be deemed to have created the m e c h a n i c s ' liens within 
the meaning of the e x c l u s i o n . Id. 
1 9 7 3 ) , 
sionary 
l i m i t e d 
conduct. 
insured, 
C o n w a y v. 
s i m i l a r l y 
clauses for 
to s i tu at i 
T i t l e I n s u r a n c e Cc 
i n d i c a t e d that 
d e f e c t s c r e a t e 
ions w h e r e the 
With regard to exclusions 
, the court stated, 
the 
d by 
>, 277 So.2d 
e n f o r c e m e n t 
the i n s u r e d 
i n s u r e d has e n g a g 
; for defects creat 
890 ( A l a . 
of 
s h< 
ed 
;ed 
e x c l u -
3uld be 
in m i s -
by t h e 
Such e x c e p t i o n s and l i m i t i n g p r o -
visions either in the language of the 
p r e s e n t p o l i c y , or in l a n g u a g e of 
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s i m i l a r i m p o r t , have been held 
effective b e c a u s e of the m i s c o n d u c t 
of the insured . . . 
C o n w a y , 277 So.2d at 893 (citations o m i t t e d ) . See also Keown 
v. West J e r s e y T i t l e & G u a r a n t y C o . , 161 N.J. Super. 19, 390 
A.2d 715 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . 
C a s e s w h i c h have e n f o r c e d e x c l u s i o n s for d e f e c t s 
c r e a t e d by the insured r e i n f o r c e the p r o p o s i t i o n s t a t e d in 
A m e r i c a n Savings and Loan and Valley Bank's position that the 
e x c l u s i o n should not be e n f o r c e d in the a b s e n c e of fraud or 
misconduct on the part of the insured. See, e.g., Brown v. St. 
Paul T i t l e I n s u r a n c e C o r p . , 634 F.2d 1103 (8th C i r . 1 9 8 0 ) 
( i n v o l v i n g m e c h a n i c s 1 liens w h i c h w e r e filed because of the 
insured-lender's failure to provide a d e q u a t e funds to pay for 
work c o m p l e t e d on a c o n s t r u c t i o n p r o j e c t ) ; Taussig v. Chicago 
T i t l e I n s u r a n c e and T r u s t C o . , 171 F.2d 553 (7th Cir. 1948) 
( i n v o l v i n g an i n s u r e d who o b t a i n e d p r o p e r t y in bad f a i t h ) ; 
C o n w a y , 277 So. 2d 890 (involving the misconduct of the insured 
m o r t g a g e e in attempting to conceal from the mortgagor the fact 
that the mortgagor could r e l e a s e his p r o p e r t y from the m o r t -
g a g e ) ; B r i c k Realty Corp. v. Title Guaranty and Trust Co., 161 
M i s c . 2 9 6 , 291 N . Y . S . 637 (1936) (involving the acquisition of 
property and a subsequent foreclosure action by the i n s u r e d as 
part of the i n s u r e d ' s f r a u d u l e n t s c h e m e to e x t i n g u i s h the 
i n s u r e d ' s w i f e ' s d o w e r r i g h t s in the p r o p e r t y f o r e c l o s e d ) ; 
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G i n g e r v. American Title Insurance Co, , 29 Mich. A p p. 279, 185 
N . W . 2 d 754 ( 1 9 7 1 ) ( i n v o l v i n g a d e f e c t of t i t l e due to the 
insured's p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the f r a u d u l e n t t r a n s f e r of p r o p -
e r t y ) ; F e l d m a n v. U r b a n Commercial, Inc., 87 N.J. Super. 391, 
209 A . 2 d 640 ( 1 9 6 5 ) (involving an insured who inappropriately 
placed a mortgage on p r o p e r t y w i t h o u t o b t a i n i n g the r e q u i r e d 
c o n s e n t as part of an u n c o n s c i o n a b l e s c h e m e to p r o t e c t his 
i n t e r e s t ) ; R o s e n b l a t t v. L o u i s v i l l e T i t l e C o . , 292 S.W. 333 
(Ky. C t . A p p . 1 9 2 7 ) ( i n v o l v i n g a d e f e c t in the t i t l e w h i c h 
resulted from the insured's fraud in p r o c u r i n g the deed from 
the g r a n t o r ) . See generally 87 A.L.R. 3d 515 ( 1 9 7 8 ) . 
A p p e l l a n t is not able to l o c a t e the h i s t o r y and 
original intent u n d e r l y i n g the p o l i c y e x c l u s i o n for d e f e c t s 
c r e a t e d by the i n s u r e d . It is l i k e l y , h o w e v e r , that the 
provision was intended to function just as it has been a p p l i e d 
by c o u r t s -- to p r o t e c t i n s u r e r s from i n s u r i n g encumbrances 
w h i c h are the r e s u l t of the i n s u r e d ' s fraud or m i s c o n d u c t . 
U n d e r l y i n g this position is the well settled principle that no 
person should b e n e f i t from his own w r o n g d o i n g . If i n s u r e r s 
w e r e to c o v e r l o s s e s i n c u r r e d by i n s u r e d s b e c a u s e of t h e i r 
culpable conduct, those insureds would be p r o t e c t e d from that 
loss and in some cases would benefit from their w r o n g d o i n g . 
Additionally, there appears to be no reason to enforce 
the exclusion for defects created by the insured in cases which 
do not involve wrongdoing on the part of the i n s u r e d . W h e r e 
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the i n s u r e d has acted in bad faith or with dishonesty, the ex-
clusion f u n c t i o n s to s h i f t the loss from the i n s u r e r to the 
i n s u r e d . If the e x c l u s i o n w e r e e n f o r c e d to deny coverage in 
cases other than those where the insured engages in f r a u d u l e n t 
c o n d u c t , the i n s u r e d w o u l d in e f f e c t be p e n a l i z e d for its 
innocent conduct. 
A c c o r d i n g to the cases discussed above, the exclusion 
for defects created by the insured will not be e n f o r c e d in the 
a b s e n c e of fraud or i n e q u i t a b l e c o n d u c t on the part of the 
insured. The position r e i n f o r c e s the p r o b a b l e i n t e n t u n d e r -
lying the exclusion and furthers the reasonable expectations of 
the p a r t i e s . Because V a l l e y Bank did not e n g a g e in fraud or 
m i s c o n d u c t with r e g a r d to the SBA T r u s t D e e d , the p o l i c y 
e x c l u s i o n s h o u l d not a p p l y to e x c l u d e c o v e r a g e for the SBA 
Trust D e e d . 
C. B e c a u s e U . S . T i t l e K n e w A b o u t the SBA Trust Deed, Valley 
B a n k S h o u l d Not be D e e m e d to H a v e C r e a t e d the SBA Trust 
Deed Within the Meaning of the Exclusion 
V a l l e y Bank s h o u l d not be deemed to have created the 
SBA T r u s t Deed for t h e f u r t h e r r e a s o n that U . S . T i t l e had 
actual knowledge of the SBA Trust Deed. (R. 105; Tr. 1 3 2 , 1 3 4 ) . 
At l e a s t one c a s e has p l a c e d g r e a t s i g n i f i c a n c e on t h e in-
surer's knowledge of a defect in determining whether an insured 
created a claim. 
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In H a n s e n v. W e s t e r n T i t l e I n s u r a n c e C o . , 33 C a 1 • 
R p t r . 6 6 8 , 671 ( C a l . D i s t . C t . A p p . 1 9 6 3 ) , the i n s u r e d s ' 
attorney drafted a c o n t r a c t ( " C o n t r a c t " ) wi t h a third p a r t y , 
W i l s o n , w h e r e b y the i n s u r e d s o b t a i n e d an o p t i o n to Wilson's 
property and an a s s i g n m e n t of an o p t i o n held by W i l s o n to a 
s e c o n d parcel of p r o p e r t y held by F i s s o r i ("Fissori P r o -
p e r t y " ) . B e c a u s e of the i n s u r e d s ' a t t o r n e y ' s p o o r d r a f t s -
m a n s h i p of the the C o n t r a c t , the C o n t r a c t gave rise to an 
interest in the Fissori P r o p e r t y to W i l s o n . The i n s u r e d s did 
not know about Wilson's possible interest. 
Subsequent to the date of the C o n t r a c t , the i n s u r e d s 
e n t e r e d into a h o l d i n g a g r e e m e n t ("Holding A g r e e m e n t " ) with 
F i s s o r i , the o w n e r of the s e c o n d parcel of p r o p e r t y . T h e 
H o l d i n g A g r e e m e n t was d r a f t e d by a t i t l e i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n y 
officer. At the time the officer p r e p a r e d the H o l d i n g A g r e e -
m e n t , the o f f i c e r knew about the C o n t r a c t previously entered 
into by the insureds and W i l s o n . The insurance company officer 
also knew about Wilson's possible interest in the property. 
In a d d r e s s i n g the issue of w h e t h e r the i n s u r e d s , 
t h r o u g h the poor d r a f t s m a n s h i p of their attorney, had created 
Wilson's claim to the F i s s o r i p r o p e r t y , the c o u r t f o c u s e d on 
the fact that the i n s u r e r knew or at least had reason to know 
of Wilson's claim. The court held that the insured will not be 
d e e m e d to have c r e a t e d the c l a i m s w h e r e "the insured did not 
i n t e n t i o n a l l y p r o d u c e the claim and [ w h e r e ] the insurer had 
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o p p o r t u n i t y to know of the d e f e c t . " Hansen, 33 Ca 1 . Rptr. at 
671 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) . The court f u r t h e r i n d i c a t e d that an 
insured may be deemed to create a claim which the insurer would 
b e u n a b l e to r e a s o n a b l y find and w h i c h r e s u l t s from the 
i n s u r e d ' s i n a d v e r t e n c e . Jjd. It is clear from the language of 
the opinion that whether the insurer had opportunity to know of 
the defect was an important element in determining w h e t h e r the 
insured would be deemed to have created the defect. 
The court in Ginger v. American Title Insurance Co. , 
29 M i c h . A p p . 2 7 9 , 135 N . W . 2 d 54 ( 1 9 7 0 ) also i n d i c a t e d the 
s i g n i f i c a n c e of w h e t h e r the i n s u r e r has k n o w l e d g e of the 
d e f e c t . The facts of Ginger involved a conveyance made to the 
insured which was set aside as a conveyance intended to defraud 
c r e d i t o r s . The trial c o u r t found that the i n s u r e d , who was 
also the d e b t o r ' s l a w y e r , had been the p r i m a r y actor in the 
fraudulent scheme. 
On appeal, the court held that the insured had created 
the d e f e c t . G i n g e r , 185 N . W . 2 d at 5 6 . Though the court did 
not g i v e a d e t a i l e d e x p l a n a t i o n for its holding, it did point 
to facts which it appeared to view as dispositive of the c a s e . 
A m o n g t h o s e facts was the fact that the insurer was unaware of 
the defect. Id. 
T h e i n s u r e r in this case not only had opportunity to 
know of the p r i o r e n c u m b r a n c e , ( T r . 1 2 0 - 2 2 , 1 2 7 - 2 8 , 1 4 6 , 
1 4 9 - 5 0 ) , but had actual knowledge of the encumbrance. (R. 105; 
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T r . 1 3 2 , 1 3 4 ) . B e c a u s e U . S . T i t l e knew about the e a r l i e r 
recorded SBA Trust Deed, Valley Bank should not be d e e m e d to 
have created the SBA Trust Deed. 
D. V a l l e y Bank S h o u l d Not be D e e m e d to Have Created the SBA 
T r u s t Deed B e c a u s e V a l l e y Bank Did Not Have Knowledge of 
the SBA Trust Deed 
A careful e x a m i n a t i o n of the m e a n i n g of the word 
" c r e a t e " p r o v i d e s a d d i t i o n a l s u p p o r t for the p o s i t i o n that 
V a l l e y M o r t g a g e s h o u l d not be deemed to have created the SBA 
Trust Deed. Courts which have c o n s i d e r e d the m e a n i n g of the 
word " c r e a t e " in the context of policy exclusions for defects 
created by the insured t y p i c a l l y d e f i n e the word as i m p l y i n g 
k n o w l e d g e or d e l i b e r a t e n e s s . The New Jersey Supreme Court in 
Feldman v. Urban Commercial, Inc., 87 N.J. Super. 391, 209 A.2d 
640 ( 1 9 6 5 ) , for example, held that the word "'create 1 connotes 
the idea of knowledge, the performance of some a f f i r m a t i v e act 
by the insured, a conscious and deliberate causation." Feldman, 
209 A.2d at 6 4 8 . See also Laabs v. Chicago Title Insurance 
Co., 72 Wis.2d 503, 241 N.W.2d 434, 438 ( 1 9 7 6 ) . The word "know-
l e d g e " h a s , in t u r n , been defined as existing where a person 
p o s s e s s e s i n f o r m a t i o n or is a w a r e of s o m e t h i n g . A n t o i n e v « 
F l e t c h e r , 307 S.W.2d 8 9 8 , 905 (Mo. App. 1 9 5 8 ) . The word "con-
s c i o u s " has been d e f i n e d as a k n o w i n g act, Ford Motor Co. v. 
W a g o n e r , 192 S.W.2d 8 5 2 , 852 (Tenn. 1 9 4 6 ) , and Webster states 
that the m e a n i n g of the word "deliberate" is characterized by 
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an a w a r e n e s s of the c o n s e q u e n c e s . M e r r i a m W e b s t e r I n c . , 
W e b s t e r ' s Ninth New C o l l e g i a t e D i c t i o n a r y ( 1 9 8 6 ) ( s e c o n d 
d e f i n i t i o n ) . 
It is clear from the definitions above, that to create 
a d e f e c t , an i n s u r e d must have full k n o w l e d g e and a c l e a r 
u n d e r s t a n d i n g that his a c t i o n s will result in a d e f e c t of 
t i t l e . A person cannot be deemed to have created a defect when 
that p e r s o n did not deliberately act to bring about the defect 
or when the p e r s o n had no k n o w l e d g e of the e x i s t e n c e of the 
defect. Additionally, the words used by courts to describe the 
word " c r e a t e " imply that the i n s u r e d must have actual know-
l e d g e to c r e a t e a d e f e c t . A p e r s o n c a n n o t , for example, be 
" c o n s c i o u s " of a fact of w h i c h he does not have actual know-
ledge. 
R e q u i r i n g actual k n o w l e d g e of the i n s u r e d for the 
p u r p o s e of d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r the i n s u r e d has c r e a t e d the 
d e f e c t is e s p e c i a l l y i m p o r t a n t in the c o n t e x t of c o m p l e x 
corporate e n t i t i e s . Corporate insureds obtain title i n s u r a n c e 
not only to insure against defects created by third parties but 
also, and just as i m p o r t a n t l y , to d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r its own 
d e p a r t m e n t s or divisions have created encumbrances on the same 
property. If corporate insureds are d e e m e d to h a v e c r e a t e d an 
e n c u m b r a n c e that was c r e a t e d by one of the c o r p o r a t i o n ' s 
d e p a r t m e n t s , encumbrances created by corporate departments will 
a l w a y s be e x c l u d e d from c o v e r a g e u n d e r the e x c l u s i o n for 
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d e f e c t s c r e a t e d by the i n s u r e d . As a r e s u l t , c o r p o r a t e 
insureds will be forced to obtain p r o f e s s i o n a l o p i n i o n s or to 
d e v e l o p internal indexing systems to locate defects created by 
corporate departments. Corporations might further be forced to 
d e v e l o p s y s t e m s of self i n s u r a n c e to i n s u r e against t h o s e 
d e f e c t s . Not only would t h e s e m e a s u r e s be highly e x p e n s i v e , 
but they w o u l d d u p l i c a t e the r e s o u r c e s a l r e a d y a m a s s e d by 
title insurance companies. * 
In d e t e r m i n i n g w h e t h e r V a l l e y Bank had actual know-
ledge of the SBA Trust Deed, it is i m p o r t a n t to i d e n t i f y each 
of the a c t o r s i n v o l v e d . The Small B u s i n e s s A d m i n i s t r a t i o n 
1
 The c o n c l u s i o n that the i n s u r e d must have actual 
knowledge in order to be deemed to have created a defect in 
title is also consistent with case law interpreting exclu-
sions for defects c r e a t e d by the i n s u r e d . In c a s e s w h i c h 
hold that the i n s u r e d did not create the defect or encum-
brance, the insured did not have actual k n o w l e d g e of the 
defect. See, e.g., First National Bank Co. of Port Chester 
v. New York T i t l e I n s u r a n c e Co., 171 Misc. 854, 12 N.Y.2d 
( 1 9 3 9 ) (the i n s u r e d - m o r t g a g e e a c c e p t e d a m o r t g a g e from 
mortgagors who were subsequently forced into an involuntary 
b a n k r u p t c y so that the m o r t g a g e b e c a m e a p r e f e r e n t i a l 
t r a n s f e r u n d e r b a n k r u p t c y l a w ) ; Foremost Construction Co. 
v. Ki11 am , 399 S.W.2d 553 (Kan. Ct. App. 1966) (involving 
u n p a i d special t a x e s w h i c h w e r e i m p r o p e r l y indexed and 
impossible to f i n d ) ; Arizona Title Insurance & Trust Co. v. 
S m i t h , 21 A r i z . App. 371, 519 P.2d 860 (1974) (insured had 
no actual k n o w l e d g e of e x i s t e n c e of unpaid special tax 
a s s e s s m e n t ) , L a a b s , 72 W i s . 2 d 5 0 3 , 241 N.W.2d 434 (1976) 
( i n s u r e d had no actual knowledge of pre-existing boundary 
d i s p u t e ) ; H a n s e n , 33 C a l . Rptr. 666 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 
1 9 6 3 ) ( i n s u r e d had no actual k n o w l e d g e that an o p t i o n 
c o n t r a c t p r e p a r e d by the i n s u r e d ' s a t t o r n e y c r e a t e d an 
i n t e r e s t in real p r o p e r t y in a third party in the in-
sured's real p r o p e r t y ) . 
- 27 -
D e p a r t m e n t i s a d e p a r t m e n t o f V a l l e y Bank. V a l l e y Bank i s i n 
t u r n a w h o l l y owned s u b s i d i a r y of V a l l e y Utah B a n c o r p o r a t i o n , a 
U tah c o r p o r a t i o n . (T r . 3 , 8 ) . V a l l e y M o r t g a g e i s a l s o a 
w h o l l y owned s u b s i d i a r y of V a l l e y Utah B a n c o r p o r a t i o n . J jd . The 
t r a n s a c t i o n w h i c h gave r i s e t o the R e s i d e n t i a l T r u s t Deed was 
hand led s o l e l y by V a l l e y M o r t g a g e p e r s o n n e l . N e i t h e r V a l l e y 
Bank nor SBA Depar tment pe rsonne l were i n v o l v e d . Though V a l l e y 
Mor tgage pe rsonne l were e x c l u s i v e l y i n v o l v e d i n the R e s i d e n t i a l 
Loan and T r u s t D e e d , t h e t r a n s a c t i o n was comple ted on V a l l e y 
Bank d o c u m e n t a t i o n . ( T r . 4 4 ) . 2 
A p p r o x i m a t e l y two weeks b e f o r e t h e R e s i d e n t i a l Loan 
c l o s e d , t h e SBA D e p a r t m e n t e x t e n d e d a $ 6 5 , 0 0 0 l o a n t o t h e 
Nances and t o o k a t r u s t deed on the P r o p e r t y . (R. 1 0 4 ) . There 
i s no e v i d e n c e t h a t V a l l e y Mor tgage p a r t i c i p a t e d i n any phase 
o f t h e t r a n s a c t i o n s w h i c h gave r i s e t o t h e SBA T r u s t D e e d . 
M o r e o v e r , V a l l e y M o r t g a g e had no k n o w l e d g e o f t h e SBA T r u s t 
Deed a t t h e t i m e t h e SBA t o o k t h e t r u s t deed or at t he t i m e 
V a l l e y M o r t g a g e l a t e r t o o k t h e R e s i d e n t i a l T r u s t D e e d . ( R . 
105; T r . 3 6 - 3 7 , 4 0 ) . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , V a l l e y Mo r t gage had no r e a s o n a b l e means 
o f f i n d i n g out about t he SBA T r u s t Deed. The r e c o r d shows t h a t 
V a l l e y M o r t g a g e d i d not have an i n d e x i n g system w i t h wh ich t o 
In closing the Residential Loan on Valley Bank documentation, i t is not 
clear whether Valley bank was acting as Valley Mortgage's agent (R. 
33), or whether Valley Mortgage was act ing as Valley Bank's agent (Tr . 
18). 
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d e t e r m i n e if either Valley Bank or Valley Mortgage had taken a 
lien on a particular parcel of real p r o p e r t y . (T r . 4 5 ) . T h e 
t e s t i m o n y i n d i c a t e s that V a l l e y M o r t g a g e relied on the 
e x p e r t i s e and r e s o u r c e s of t i t l e i n s u r a n c e c o m p a n i e s to 
d e t e r m i n e the state of t i t l e . Ul_. At the time Valley Mortgage 
t o o k the Residential Trust Deed, the normal procedure by which 
to d e t e r m i n e whether a prior lien existed on p r o p e r t y , w h e t h e r 
c r e a t e d by V a l l e y M o r t g a g e , V a l l e y B a n k , a d e p a r t m e n t of 
Valley Bank, or by a third party, was to obtain a title report. 
I d . B e c a u s e Valley Mortgage had no knowledge of the SBA Trust 
Deed and no r e a s o n a b l e m e a n s of f i n d i n g out w h e t h e r another 
department at Valley Bank had created a l i e n on the p r o p e r t y , 
Valley Bank could not have obtained knowledge of the SBA Trust 
Deed through Valley M o r t g a g e . 
The meaning of the word "create" includes and requires 
that the i n s u r e d h a v e actual k n o w l e d g e of that w h i c h he is 
c r e a t i n g . An i n s u r e d s h o u l d not be deemed to have created a 
defect of which he is u n a w a r e . In this c a s e , the SBA D e p a r t -
m e n t c r e a t e d the SBA T r u s t D e e d . V a l l e y Bank did not h a v e 
actual k n o w l e d g e of the e x i s t e n c e of the SBA T r u s t D e e d . 
A c c o r d i n g l y , Valley Bank should not be deemed to have "creat-
ed" the Trust Deed for p u r p o s e s of the e x c l u s i o n for d e f e c t s 
c r e a t e d by the i n s u r e d and is t h e r e f o r e entitled to coverage 
with regard to the SBA Trust Deed. 
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ARGUMENT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN 
CONCLUDING THAT THE EXCLUSION 
FOR DEFECTS CREATED BY THE 
INSURED IS EFFECTIVE TO DENY 
COVERAGE FOR THE SBA TRUST 
DEED 
It is well settled that contracts which are against 
public policy are void and unenforceable. McCall v. Frampton, 
99 Misc.2d 159, 415 N.Y.S.2d 752, 758 (1979). Though what 
constitutes public policy is difficult to define, it is often 
said that public policy is the reflection of society's values 
at a particular time and of policies which further the well 
being of society as a whole. One of the public interests 
relevant to this case is society's interest in encouraging 
parties to perform their contractual obligations. Contract law 
has traditionally protected injured, innocent parties by 
requiring that the breaching party make the innocent party 
whole. The enforcement of the exclusion for defects created by 
the insured under the facts of this case would not only violate 
public policy but would constitute a miscarriage of justice. 
As discussed above in Argument II, a title insurance 
policy is a contractual warranty, whereby the insurer agrees to 
research the state of title and to warrant the title as 
represented to the insured. See Bush v. Coul t, 594 P.2d 865, 
867 (Utah 1979). The record is clear that the SBA Trust Deed 
was of record prior to the time Mountain View issued Valley 
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Bank the Commitment and prior to the time U . S . Title issued the 
Policy to Valley Bank. (R. 1 0 4 - 0 5 ) . M o r e i m p o r t a n t l y , U . S . 
T i t l e had actual k n o w l e d g e of the p r i o r l i e n . (R. 105; Tr. 
132, 1 3 4 ) . Not only did U . S . Title fail to list the SBA T r u s t 
Deed as an e x c e p t i o n to coverage in breach of its contractual 
o b l i g a t i o n s , (Ex. 1 ) , but it also failed to inform V a l l e y Bank 
of the existence of the prior lien. (Tr. 134, 138, 1 6 0 - 6 1 ) . 
A ruling for U . S . Title is t a n t a m o u n t to s a n c t i o n i n g 
U . S . T i t l e ' s n e g l i g e n c e and breach of contract. Enforcing the 
e x c l u s i o n in t h i s case will allow U . S . T i t l e to use the 
e x c l u s i o n to u n f a i r l y e s c a p e c o v e r a g e . A d d i t i o n a l l y , U . S . 
Title's failure to list the SBA Trust Deed as an e x c e p t i o n to 
c o v e r a g e prevented Valley Bank from taking measures to protect 
itself against the earlier encumbrance. U . S . Title knew that 
V a l l e y M o r t g a g e was g o i n g to sell the R e s i d e n t i a l Loan to 
Federal Home and yet it failed to inform either Valley Mortgage 
or F e d e r a l Home of the p r i o r e n c u m b r a n c e . ( T r . 1 3 4 , 1 3 8 , 
1 6 0 - 6 1 ) . Had Valley Bank or Valley M o r t g a g e known of the SBA 
Trust Deed, they could have withheld from selling the SBA Trust 
Deed on the s e c o n d a r y m a r k e t and t h e r e b y p r e v e n t e d V a l l e y 
Bank ' s 1oss . 
U . S . T i t l e ' s conduct is even more grievous in view of 
the underlying p u r p o s e s and p r a c t i c a l w o r k i n g s of the t i t l e 
i n s u r a n c e system. Title insurance was developed so that title 
information ctiuld be concentrated in one area to i n c r e a s e t h e 
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c e r t a i n t y of t i t l e o p i n i o n s , to i n c r e a s e e f f i c i e n c y , and to 
d e c r e a s e e x p e n s e . See Bush, 594 P.2d at 8 6 7 . Lenders such as 
V a l l e y B a n k comprise a large category of title policy insureds 
and u s u a l l y c o n s i s t of n u m e r o u s d e p a r t m e n t s , d i v i s i o n s and 
s u b s i d i a r y c o r p o r a t i o n s . The p o s i t i o n of V a l l e y Bank is 
analogous to, for example, Citicorp, a complex corporate entity 
h a v i n g b r a n c h e s l o c a t e d t h r o u g h o u t the U n i t e d S t a t e s . Such 
l e n d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s a p p l y for t i t l e i n s u r a n c e not o n l y to 
insure against encumbrances held by third parties but, of equal 
importance, to insure against encumbrances created by their own 
d i v i s i o n s . If i n s u r e r s are a l l o w e d to e s c a p e c o v e r a g e in a 
s i t u a t i o n such as t h i s , i n s u r e d s will be f o r c e d to d e v e l o p 
i n t e r n a l i n d e x i n g s y s t e m s to l o c a t e defects created by other 
departments or subsidiaries as well as s y s t e m s of s e l f i n s u r -
ance to insure against those d e f e c t s . Both measures would be a 
w a s t e of the r e s o u r c e s a l r e a d y a m a s s e d by t i t l e i n s u r a n c e 
companies and the expense of these measures would ultimately be 
p a s s e d on to l e n d i n g i n s t i t u t i o n c u s t o m e r s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , 
t h e r e is no p o l i c y r e a s o n why d e f e c t s created by the insured 
without any fraud or misconduct and which are not known to the 
i n s u r e d s h o u l d not be i n s u r e d just as any other e n c u m b r a n c e , 
where the insured is able to locate the d e f e c t . 
F i n a l l y , not only w o u l d the e n f o r c e m e n t of the 
exclusion violate public policy, but it would also run a g a i n s t 
p r i n c i p l e s of fair dealing and j u s t i c e . As mentioned above in 
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A r g u m e n t 1 1 ( B ) , the a p p l i c a t i o n of e x c l u s i o n s for d e f e c t s 
created by the insured o f t e n d e p e n d s on e q u i t a b l e c o n s i d e r a -
t i o n s , i n c l u d i n g w h e t h e r the i n s u r e d is i n n o c e n t of any 
w r o n g d o i n g or w o u l d d e r i v e a w i n d f a l l p r o f i t from r e c o v e r y 
a g a i n s t its i n s u r e r . See American Savings and Loan v. Lawyers 
Title Insurance Corp., 793 F.2d 780, 784-85 (6th Cir. 1 9 8 6 ) . In 
this case, the equities are clearly on the side of Valley Bank. 
V a l l e y Bank paid the r e q u i r e d p r e m i u m to M o u n t a i n V i e w in 
c o m p l i a n c e w i t h its c o n t r a c t u a l obligations under the Policy. 
Valley Bank had no knowledge of the p r i o r SBA T r u s t D e e d , had 
no r e a s o n a b l e means of locating the prior encumbrance, and had 
no duty to do so. Valley Bank is free from any i n e q u i t a b l e or 
c u l p a b l e c o n d u c t . On the o t h e r h a n d , U . S . Title breached is 
contract of title i n s u r a n c e by f a i l i n g to list the SBA T r u s t 
Deed as an exception to c o v e r a g e . Though U . S . Title knew of 
the earlier encumbrance and knew that Valley Mortgage was going 
to sell the loan to Federal Home, it failed to disclose those 
facts to Valley Bank or to Federal H o m e . U . S . Title's conduct 
is clearly culpable and i n e q u i t a b l e . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , to impose the loss on V a l l e y Bank u n d e r 
the f a c t s of this c a s e is harsh and unjustified. Valley Bank 
did not c a u s e the l o s s it i n c u r r e d . T h r o u g h its f a i l u r e to 
d i s c l o s e the e x i s t e n c e of a p r i o r lien to V a l l e y Bank, U . S . 
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T i t l e was t h e d i r e c t cause of V a l l e y Bank ' s l o s s . Wh i l e V a l l e y 
Bank conducted itself appropriately, U.S. Title was culpable in 
its dealings with Valley Bank. To enforce the exclusion under 
the facts of this case rises to the level of unconscion-
abi1i ty . 
ARGUMENT IV 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE 
ESTOPPEL PROHIBITS U.S. TITLE 
FROM RELYING ON THE TITLE 
POLICY EXCLUSION TO AVOID 
COVERAGE 
The doctrine of equitable estoppel is founded upon 
principles of fair dealing and good conscience. The doctrine 
has developed to prevent the manifest injustice which results 
to one party when the other party relies on a legal right to 
take unconscionable advantage of his own wrongdoing. Hatter of 
Shaw, 189 Mont. 310, 615 P.2d 910, 914 (1980). The Utah 
Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the doctrine and has 
set forth the elements of equitable estoppel as requiring: 1) 
conduct, representations, or admissions made by one party, 2) 
which lead another party to take action in reasonable reliance 
thereon, and 3) which action results in detriment to the second 
party. Blackhurst v, Trans america Insurance Co., 699 P.2d 688, 
691 (Utah 1985); Celebrity Club Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control, 
602 P.2d 689, 694 (Utah 1979) . 
The facts involved in the case at bar conform exactly 
with the elements required by the doctrine of equitable 
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e s t o p p e l . It is clear that the conduct required on the part of 
the party to be estopped need not be a f f i r m a t i v e , but may be 
the f a i l u r e to act or speak when that p a r t y ought to act or 
s p e a k . H u n t e r v. H u n t e r , 669 P.2d 4 3 0 , 4 3 2 , 433 (Utah 1 9 8 3 ) . 
Because U . S . Title had a contractual duty to disclose the prior 
lien to Valley Bank, U . S . T i t l e ' s f a i l u r e to reveal the SBA 
T r u s t Deed to V a l l e y Bank s a t i s f i e s the first element of the 
doctrine of equitable estoppel requiring action or a failure to 
a c t . F u r t h e r m o r e , in view of the fact that the Policy was a 
w a r r a n t y of the state of title to the Property, Bush v. Coul t, 
594 P.2d 8 6 5 , 867 (Utah 1 9 7 9 ) , U . S . Title's failure to disclose 
the existence of the SBA Trust Deed was tantamount to a r e p r e -
sentation that the prior lien on the property did not exist. 
Valley Bank received the Commitment of Title Insurance 
on or about April 1 5 , 1 9 8 3 . The Commitment listed two prior 
encumbrances held by First Security Bank of Utah and C i t i z e n s 
Bank. (Ex. 2 ) . The Commitment did not list the SBA Trust Deed 
as an e x c e p t i o n to c o v e r a g e . (Ex. 2 ) . Valley Bank relied on 
the C o m m i t m e n t in a s s i g n i n g the R e s i d e n t i a l T r u s t Deed to 
Valley Mortgage and Valley Mortgage relied on the Commitment in 
a s s i g n i n g the R e s i d e n t i a l T r u s t Deed to F e d e r a l H o m e . In 
c o n n e c t i o n with the a s s i g n m e n t s , V a l l e y Bank and V a l l e y 
Mortgage both warranted that the Residential Trust Deed was the 
f i r s t t r u s t deed on the Property. (R. 2 ) . If Valley Mortgage 
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had k n o w n of the SBA T r u s t D e e d , it w o u l d not have sold the 
Residential Loan on the secondary market and Valley Bank w o u l d 
not h a v e i n c u r r e d the loss w h i c h it i n c u r r e d as a result of 
that s a l e . 
V a l l e y Bank not only relied on the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s 
made by U . S . Title in the Policy but that reliance was r e a s o n -
a b l e and j u s t i f i e d . The title insurance system is designed so 
that upon paying a premium, an insured can obtain a d e t e r m i n a -
t i o n of the s t a t e of t i t l e to c e r t a i n real p r o p e r t y . The 
policy of title insurance is in effect a warranty by the t i t l e 
company as to the state of title as the company has represented 
it. Bush, 594 P.2d at 8 6 7 . The system is designed so that the 
i n s u r e d may rely on the r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s m a d e by the t i t l e 
c o m p a n y and so that in the e v e n t t h o s e r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s are 
i n c o m p l e t e or inaccurate, the company will cover the insured's 
1 o s s . 
V a l l e y Bank was e n t i t l e d to rely on the representa-
tions made in U . S . Title's policy of insurance for the f u r t h e r 
r e a s o n t h a t V a l l e y Bank had no d u t y to check the accuracy of 
U . S . T i t l e ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s . In Bush v. C o u l t , the Utah 
S u p r e m e C o u r t held t h a t an insured has no duty to perform the 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s of the i n s u r e r to a s c e r t a i n the s t a t e of 
t i t l e . B u s h , 594 P.2d at 8 6 7 . V a l l e y B a n k ' s r e l i a n c e is 
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reasonable for the further reason that Valley Bank did not know 
of the prior lien, (R. 105), and had no reasonable means of 
discovering the lien. (Tr. 44-45). 
After becoming aware of the existence of SBA Trust 
Deed, Federal Home made demand upon Valley Bank that Valley 
Bank either repurchase the Residential Loan or bring the loan 
current. (Tr. 56; Ex. 10). In December, 1986, Valley Bank paid 
Federal Home $103,912.78, the full amount remaining due and 
owing under the Residential Loan. (R. 106; Ex.12). The damage 
incurred by Valley Bank in having to pay the Residential Loan 
clearly resulted from U.S. Title's failure to list the SBA 
Trust Deed as an exception to coverage on the Policy. Having 
failed to list the SBA Trust Deed in breach of its obligations 
under the Policy, U.S. Title is now estopped from asserting the 
exclusion for defects created by the insured as a bar to U.S. 
Title's liability for Valley Bank's loss incurred as a result 
of the SBA Trust Deed. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in its legal conclusion that 
the exclusion for defects created by the insured applies to 
exclude coverage for the SBA Trust Deed. Accordingly, Valley 
Bank respectfully requests that this court reverse the judgment 
entered by the District Court, enter judgment in favor of 
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V a l l e y Bank as a m a t t e r of law, and r e m a n d the c a s e to the 
trial c o u r t on the i s s u e of the d a m a g e s i n c u r r e d by V a l l e y 
Bank . 
DATED this 22d day of January, 1 9 8 8 . 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Elcrzabeth S. Whitney 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM No. 1 
STEVEN H. GUNN (A1272) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
400 Deseret Building 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo— 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY, : 
a Utah corporation, 
: FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, CONCLUSIONS OF L2W 
v. 
: Civil No. C-86-2379 
U.S. TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF DALLAS, a Texas corporation, : (Judge Wilkinson) 
Defendant. : 
oooOooo 
The trial in the above case came on for hearing on the 14th day of 
May, 1987, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Court Judge. 
Appearing on behalf of the plaintiff was Roy G. Haslam of the law firm of 
Biele, Haslam & Hatch. Appearing on behalf of the defendant was Steven H. 
Gunn of the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker. Having received various 
documents into evidence and having heard the testimony of witnesses and the 
arguments of counsel, the Court now enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACTS: 
1. Plaintiff brings this action seeking damages under a certain 
Mortgagee Policy of Title Insurance (the "Policy") (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3). 
Under the Policy plaintiff is listed as the "named insured". By endorse-
ment the Federal Heme Loan Mortgage Corporation ("FHLMC") was also added as 
an insured. 
2. The Policy was issued for the purpose of insuring plaintiff's 
trust deed lien on certain real property (the "subject property") located 
in Summit Countyf Utah. The trust deed insured under the Policy secured 
payment of a loan by plaintiff to F. Kent Nance and Patricia J. Nance in 
the sum of $101
 f500.00. (Hereinafter the loan secured by the trust deed 
covered under the Policy shall be referred to as the "residential loan" and 
the trust deed shall be referred to as the "residential trust deed".) The 
residential trust deed was executed April 25
 f 1983,- and was recorded April2 
6, 1983. Subsequent to the closing of the loan, plaintiff assigned the 
loan to FHLMC. 
3. The residential loan was closed April 26, 1983, and the title 
policy was issued some time subsequent to July 22, 1983. Neither the 
Policy nor the Cannmitment which preceded it specifically identified and 
excluded the SEA trust deed from insurance coverage. 
4. Previous to the time of the closing of the residential loan 
plaintiff1s SBA loan department had loaned the Nances the sum of $65,000.00 
and had taken as security for that loan a trust deed on the subiect 
property. (Hereinafter the said earlier loan made by plaintiff shall be 
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referred to as the "SBA loan" and the trust deed which secured its payments 
will be referred to as the "SBA trust deed.) The date of execution of the 
SBA trust deed was April 1, 1983. It was recorded on April 5, 1983. 
5. The officer of plaintiff who closed the residential loan, Paul 
Thurston, was unaware at the time of closing of the existence of the SBA 
loan. 
6. At the time the title policy was issued by defendant insuring 
the residential loan, its agent, Mountain View Title, was aware that the 
prior SBA trust deed was of record and failed to communicate such knowledge 
to the plaintiff prior to issuing the Policy. 
7. Paragraph 3(a) ("Exclusions from Coverage") of the Policy 
provides: 
The following matters are expressly excluded frcm coverage 
of this Policy: 
• • • 
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other 
matters (a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the 
insured claimant . . . 
8. In November, 1983, the Nances borrowed the sum of $10,000.00 
from Intermountain Thrift & Loan ("Intermountain Thrift") and gave as 
security a trust deed on the subject property and on an adjacent unimproved 
lot owned bv the Nances. 
9. In early 1984, the Nances defaulted in making payments on the 
SBA and residential loans. They also defaulted on the Intermountain Thrift 
loan. As a consequence, Intermountain Thrift filed a notice of default and 
thereafter sold the subject property and the adjacent lot by trustee's sale 
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on April 4, 1985. Plaintiff was the successful bidder at the sale and 
received a Trustee's Deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit 8A) which recited a purchase 
price in the sum of $11,941.45. 
10. At no time has plaintiff or FHLMC ever foreclosed judicially 
or nonjudicially on the subject property. 
11. On or about November 21,1986, plaintiff sold the subject 
property to Gary T. Weaver and Shauna L. Weaver ("the Weavers") and 
delivered to them a warranty deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit 21). 
12. The purchase price paid by the Weavers to plaintiff upon sale 
of the subject property was $55,000.00. The net proceeds which plaintiff 
received frcm the sale was $51
 f857.17. The proceeds of sale were applied 
by plaintiff against the amount owed on the SBA loan. 
13. On or about December 23
 f 1986, plaintiff released its SBA 
trust deed lien on the subject property by a Full Reconveyance (Defendant's 
Exhibit 25). 
14. On or about December 11, 1986, plaintiff paid EHLMC the full 
amount owed under the residential loan. An officer of plaintiff testified 
at trial that the residential trust deed lien would be released by recon-
veyance as soon as practical following the trial. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Factf the Court enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. The act of plaintiff in obtaining frcm the Nances a trust deed 
lien on the subject property to secure payment of the SBA loan ™created^a 
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lien or encumbrance" within the meaning of the Policy• 
B. The lien of the SEA trust deed is excluded from coverage under 
the Policy by paragraph 3(a) of the Exclusions from Coverage. 
C. Defendant is not liable under the Policy for losses incurred 
by Plaintiff as a result of the existence of the SEA trust deed. 
D. Plaintiff's ccmplaint should be dismissed with prejudice and 
upon the merits. 
E. Because the SBA trust deed is excluded from coverage under the 
Policy, it is unnecessary for the Court to determine what loss plaintiff 
incurred as the result of the existence of the said trust deed or to 
determine whether plaintiff breached the Policy as alleged by Defendant in 
its Supplemental Answer. 
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L i r e u l Lb INSU^AN&EXompany of Dallas 
Mortgagee Policy t ^ / ^ 
Insurance ADDENDUM MO.
 2 | { EXHIBIT s 
^3 
POLICY OF TITLE INSURANCE Issued by USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas. 
SUBJECT TO THE EXCLUSIONS FROM COVERAGE. THE EXCEPTIONS CONTAINED IN 
SCHEDULE B AND THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
HEREOF, USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas, a Texas corporation, herein called 
the Company, insures, as of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A, against loss or damage, 
not exceeding the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, and costs, attorneys fees 
and expenses which the Company may become obligated to pay hereunder, sustained or 
incurred by the insured by reason of: 
1. Title to the estate or interest described in Schedule A being vested otherwise than as 
stated therein: 
2. Any defect in or lien or encumbrance on such title; 
3. Lack of a right of access to and from the land; 
4. Unmarketability of such title; 
5. The invalidity or unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage upon said estate 
or interest except to the extent that such invalidity or unenforceability, or claim thereof, 
arises out of the transaction evidenced by the insured mortgage and is based upon 
a. usury, or 
b. any consumer credit protection or truth in lending law; 
6. The priority of any lien or encumbrance over the lien of the insured mortgage; 
7. Any statutory lien for labor or material which now has gained or hereafter may gain 
priority over the lien of the insured mortgage, except any such lien arising from an 
improvement on the land contracted for and commenced subsequent to Date o* Policy 
not financed in whole or in part by proceeds of the indebtedness secured by the insured 
mortgage which at Date of Policy, the insured has advanced or is obligated to advance; or 
8. The invalidity or unenforceability of any assignment, shown in Schedule A, of the 
insured mortgage or the failure of said assignment to vest title to the insured mortgage 
in the named insured assignee free and clear of all liens. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas has caused this 
pplicy to be signed and sealed by its duly authorized officers in facsimile to be valid, as 
of Date of Policy shown in Schedule A. only when it bears an authorized, original 
countersignature. 
tfUf</tiL 
President & Chief Executive Officer 
/&6«f/kciA*/0&~l^ 
C:AUIUSIOIIS i-rom 
The following matters are expressly excluded from the coverage 
of this policy: 
1. Any law, ordinance or governmental regulation (including but 
not limited to building and zoning ordinances) restricting or 
regulating or prohibiting the occupancy, use or enjoyment of 
the land, or regulating the character, dimensions or location 
of any improvement now or hereafter erected on the land, or 
prohibiting a separation in ownership or a reduction in the 
dimensions or area of the land, or the effect of any violation 
of any such law, ordinance or governmental regulation. 
2. Rights of eminent domain or governmental rights of police 4 
power unless notice of the exercise of such rights appears in 
the public records at Date of Policy. 
3. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims, or other mat-
ters.(a) created, suffered, assumed or agreed to by the insured 
Conditions and Stipulations 
1. Definition of Terms 
The following terms when used in this policy mean: 
(a) "insured": the insured named in Schedule A. The term "in-
sured" also includes (i) the owner of the indebtedness secured by 
the insured mortgage and each successor in ownership of such 
indebtedness (reserving, however, all rights and defenses as to any 
such successor who acquires the indebtedness by operation of law 
as distinguished from purchase including, but not limited to, heirs, 
distributees, devisees, survivors, personal representatives, next of 
kin or corporate or fiduciary successors that the Company would 
have had against the successor's transferor), and further includes 
(ii) any governmental agency or instrumentality which is an insurer 
or guarantor under an insurance contract or guaranty insuring or 
guaranteeing said indebtedness, or any part thereof, whether 
named as an insured herein or not, and (iii) the parties designated 
in paragraph 2 (a) of these Conditions and Stipulations. 
(b) "insured claimant": an insured claiming loss or damage 
hereunder. 
(c) "knowledge": actual knowledge, not constructive knowl-
edge or notice which may be imputed to an insured by reason of 
any public records. 
(d) "land": the land described, specifically or by reference in 
Schedule A. and improvements affixed thereto which by law con-
stitute real property: provided, however, the term "land" does not 
include any property beyond the lines of the area specifically de-
scribed or referred to in Schedule A, nor any right, title, interest, 
estate or easement in abutting streets, roads, avenues, alleys, lanes, 
ways or waterways, but nothing herein shall modify or limit the extent 
to which a right of access to and from the land is insured by this policy. 
(e) "mortgage": mortgage, deed of trust, trust deed, or other 
security instrument. 
(f) "public records": those records which by Jaw impart con-
structive notice of matters relating to said land. 
Coverage 
claimant; (b) not known to the Company and not shown by th 
public records but known to the insured claimant either z 
Date of Policy or at the date such claimant acquired an estat 
or interest insured by this policy or acquired the insured mor 
gage and not disclosed in writing by the insured claimant t 
the Company prior to the date such insured claimant becam 
an insured hereunder: (c) resulting in no loss or damage to th 
insured claimant: (d) attaching or created subsequent to Dat 
of Policy (except to the extent insurance is afforded herein a 
to any statutory lien for labor or material). 
Unenforceability of the lien of the insured mortgage because 
of failure of the insured at Date of Policy or of any subsequen 
owner of the indebtedness to comply with applicable "doinc 
business" laws of the state in which the land is situated. 
(a) Continuation of Insurance after Acquisition 
of Title 
This policy shall continue in force as of Date of Policy in favor of 
an insured who acquires all or any part of the estate or interest in 
the land described in Schedule A by foreclosure, trustee's sale, con-
veyance in lieu of foreclosure, or other legal manner which dis-
charges the lien of the insured mortgage, and if the insured is a 
corporation, its transferee of the estate or interest so acquired, 
provided the transferee is the parent or wholly owned subsidiary of 
the insured: and in favor of any governmental agency or instrumen-
tality which acquires all or any part of the estate or interest 
pursuant to a contract of insurance or guaranty insuring or guaran-
teeing the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage: provided 
that the amount of insurance hereunder after such acquisition, 
exclusive of costs, attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company 
may become obligated to pay, shall not exceed the least of: 
(i) the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A; 
(ii) the amount of the unpaid principal of the indebtedness as 
defined in paragraph 8 hereof, plus interest thereon, expenses 
of foreclosure and amounts advanced to protect the lien of the 
insured mortgage and secured by said insured mortgage at 
the time of acquisition of such estate or interest in the land: or 
(iii) the amount paid by any governmentaj^ge 
(Conditions ^g^tipulations continue^ and concluded on last pa 
tality, if such agency or instrumentality is the insured claimant, 
in the acquisition of such estate or interest in satisfaction of 
its insurance contract or guaranty. 
(b) Continuation of insurance after Conveyance 
of Title 
The coverage of this policy shall continue in force as of Date 
of Policy in favor of an insured so long as such insured retains an 
estate or interest in the land, or holds an indebtedness secured by 
a purchase money mortgage given by a purchaser from such in-
sured, or so long as such insured shall have liability by reason of 
covenants of warranty made by such insured in any transfer or 
conveyance of such estate or interest: provided, however, this 
policy shall not continue in force in favor of any purchaser from 
such insured of either said estate or interest or the indebtedness 
secured by a purchase money mortgage given to such insured. 
3. Defense and Prosecution of Actions—Notice of 
Claim to be given by an insured Claimant 
(a) The Company, at its own cost and without undue delay, shall 
provide for the defense of an insured in all litigation consisting of 
actions or proceedings commenced against such insured, or 
defenses, restraining orders or injunctions interposed against a 
foreclosure of the insured mortgage or a defense interposed against 
an insured in an action to enforce a contract for a sale of 
the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, or a sale of the 
estate or interest in said land, to the extent that such litigation is 
founded upon an alleged defect, lien, encumbrance, or other matter 
insured against by this policy. 
(b) The insured shall notify the Company promptly in writing 
(i) in case any action or proceeding is begun or defense or restrain-
ing order or injunction is interposed as set forth in (a) above, (ii) in 
case knowledge shall come to an insured hereunder of any claim of 
title or interest which is adverse to the title to the estate or interest 
or the lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, and which might 
cause loss or damage for which the Company may be liable by virtue 
of this policy, or (iii) if title to the estate or interest or the lien of 
the insured mortgage, as insured, is rejected as unmarketable. If 
such prompt notice shall not be given to the Company, then as to 
such insured all liability of the Company shall cease and terminate 
in regard to the matter or matters for which such prompt notice is 
required: provided, however, that failure to notify shall in no case 
prejudice the rights of any such insured under this policy unless the 
Company shall be prejudiced by such failure and then only to the 
extent of such prejudice* 
(c) The Company shall have the right at its own cost to institute and 
without undue delay prosecute any action or proceeding or to do any 
other act which in its opinion may be necessary or desirable to establish 
the title to the estate or interest or the lien of the insured mortgage, as 
insured, and the Company may take any appropriate action under the 
terms of this policy, whether or not it shall be liable thereunder, and shall 
not thereby concede liability or waive any provision of this policy. 
(d) Whenever the Company shall have brought any action or inter-
posed a defense as required or permitted by the provions of this policy. 
.theCompany may pursue any such litigation to final determination by a 
court of competent jurisdiction and expressly reserves the right, in its 
gency or instrumen- sole discretion, to appea^pm any adverse judgment or order. 
M U f b l b b 
SCHEDULE A 
)ate of Policy: A p r i l 2 6 , 1983 @ 4 : 0 0 p .m. GF No.
 D 2643 
Amount of Insurance $ 1 0 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 
( 4 3 5 . 0 0 ) 
Name of Insured: 
VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY 
The estate or interest in the land described in this Schedule and which is encumbered by the insured mortgage is: (a fee, a 
leasehold, etc.) 
fee simple 
The estate or interest referred to herein is at Date of Policy vested in: 
F. KENT NANCE & PATRICIA J. NANCE, 
his wife, as joint tenants 
The mortgage, herein referred to as the insured mortgage, and the assignments thereof, if any, are described as 
follows: 
DEED OF TRUST 
Dated: April 25, 1983 
Amount: $101,500.00 
Trustor: F. KENT NANCE & PATRICIA J. NANCE, husband and wife 
Beneficiary: VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY 
Trustee: VALLEY BANK & TRUST COMPANY 
Recorded: April 26, 1983 
Entry Number: 205040 
Book: 258 Page: 542 
The land referred to in this policy is described as follows: 
Beginning 173.55 feet North and 1466.1 feet East of the Quarter 
Section corner on the West line of Section 17, Township 3 South, 
Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, and running thence North 
185.97 feet, more or less, to the South boundary line of State Road 
Right of Way; thence along said boundary South 69 59* East 106.4 
feet; thence South 148.78 feet; thence East 100 feet to the place of 
beginning. Also being known and designated as Lot 3 of Kamp Kill 
Kare Lots, according to the official plat thereof on file in the office 
of the County Recorder of Summit County. Together with a right of 
way 20 feet wide being 10 feet on either side of the following described 
centerline, being on a point on the South Quarter boundary line of 
State Road Right of Way 632 feet North and 856.1 feet East of the 
Ouarter Section corner of the West line of said section 17; thence 
South 468.5 feet East 1080 feet; thence North 40 feet, more or less, 
to the State Road Right of Way. 
POLICY NO M 076156 
This Policy does not insure against loss or damage by reason of the following: 
Taxes for the year 1982 were paid- SERIAL NUMBER: KK 3 
Said property is included within the boundaries of the Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District, South Summit Fire Protection.District, South Summit 
Cemetery Maintenance District, Special District #7 and is subject to any 
charges and assessments levied by them as a result of services provided. 
Charges are current. 
Rights of way for any roads, ditches, canals or transmission lines now 
existing over, under or across said property. 
Any and all outstanding oil, gas, mining and mineral rights, etc., 
together with the right of the proprietor of a vein or lode to extract 
his ore therefrom should the same'be found to penetrate on intersect 
the premises, and the right to ingress and egress for the use of said 
rights. 
WARRANTY DEED 
Dated: January 29, 1953 
Deeded to: MASON CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
Book: U Page: 332 
"As a part of the consideration for this Deed, the Grantee agrees not 
to use the above described property to conduct a business, trade or 
manufacture of any sort or nature, no buildings shall be erected thereon 
except one private dwelling house with a garage appurtenant thereto. Any 
violation of the above mentioned restrictions shall cause this Deed to 
become null and void.11 
SCHEDULE B-PARTII 
In addition to the matters set forth in Part I of this Schedule, the title to the estate or interest in the land described or referred to 
in Schedule A is subject to the following matters, if any be shown, but the Company insures that such matters are subordinate 
to the lien or charge of the insured mortgage upon said estate or interest: 
None 
AA4Cmr>AM i A M n T I T I c A C c n r i A T i n M i / - \ A » I ar\i i /*v c n n u « m n A U C k i n e n i n t-r -in 
Endorsement 
(to and forming a part of Policy of Title Insurance No. . . . y/P.^rP. ) 
Issued by 
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE Company of Dallas (Herein called the company) 
The Company hereby insures against loss which said Insured shall sustain by reason of any of the following 
matters: 
1 . Any incorrectness in the assurance which the Company hereby gives: 
(a) That there are no covenants, conditions, or restrictions under which the lien of the mortgage or deed 
of trust referred to in Schedule A can be cut off. subordinated, or otherwise impaired; 
(b) That there are no present violations on said land of any enforceable covenants, conditions, or restrictions; 
(c) That, except as shown in Schedule B. there are no encroachments of buildings, structures, or improvements 
located on said land onto adjoining lands, nor any encroachments onto said land of buildings, structures, 
or improvements located on adjoining lands. 
2. (a) Any future violations on said land of any covenants, conditions, or restrictions occurring prior to acquisition 
of title to said estate or interest by the Insured, provided such violations result in loss or impairment of the lien of 
the mortgage referred to in Schedule A, or result in loss or impairment of the title to said estate or interest if the 
Insured shall acquire such title in satisfaction of the indebtedness secured by such mortgage; 
(b) Unmarketability of the title to said estate or interest by reason of any violations on said land, occurring prior to 
acquisition of title to said estate or interest by the Insured, of any covenants, conditions, or restrictions. 
3. Damage to existing improvements, including lawns, shrubbery-or trees: 
(a) Which are located or encroach upon that portion of the land subject to any easement shown in Schedule 
B. which damage results from the exercise of the right to use or maintain such easement for the purposes for 
which the same was granted or reserved; 
(b) Resulting from the exercise of any right to use the surface of said land for the extraction or development 
of the minerals excepted from the description of said land or shown as a reservation in Schedule B. 
4. Any final court order or judgment requiring removal from any land adjoining said land of any encroachment 
shown in Schedule B. 
The total liability of the Company under said policy and any endorsements attached thereto shall, however, 
not exceed, in the aggregate, the face amount of said policy and the costs which the Company is obligated 
under the schedules, conditions and stipulations thereof to pay. 
This endorsement is made a part of said policy and is subject to the schedules, conditions and stipulations 
therein, except as modified by the provisions hereof. 
This Endorsement is not to be construed as insuring the title as of any later date than the date of said policy, 
except as herein expressly provided as to the subject matter hereof. 
Signed under seal for the Company, but this Endorsement is to become valid only when it bears an authorized 
countersignature. 
Dated: Ap r i l 26, 1983 
President & Chief Executive Officer 
^uJ/kte/^tf&U^ 
Attest: Vice/president, Secretary and Genejzi Counsel 
AdwtrkedOfftcer or Agent 
CLTA Form 100 (Utah-Arz.)20M 179H 
Endorsement 
(to and forming a part of Policy of Title Insurance No. 
. M 0761.56 , 
Issued by 
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE Company of Dallas (Herein called the company) 
The Company assures the Insured that at the date of said policy there is located on said land 
A single family dwelling also known as: 
The 7 Mile Marker of Highway 35 
Woodiand, Utah 84036 
and that the map attached to this policy shows the correct location and dimensions of the land described 
in Schedule A as described by those records which under the recording laws impart constructive notice as 
to said land. 
The Company hereby insures the Insured against loss which said Insured shall sustain in the event the assurances 
herein shall prove to be incorrect. 
The total liability of the Company under said policy and any endorsements attached thereto shall; however, not 
exceed, in the aggregate, the face amount of said policy and the costs which the Company is obligated under 
the schedules, conditions and stipulations thereof to pay. 
This endorsement is made a part of said policy and is subject to the schedules, conditions and stipulations 
therein, except as modified by the provisions hereof. 
Signed under seal for the Company, but this Endorsement is to become valid only when it bears an authorized 
countersignature. 
Dated: April 26, 1983 
President A Chief Executive Officer 
M,J/k,,lu/{?AJ^ 
Attest VicerP/esidenr Secretary and General Counsel 
CLTA Form 116<Uuh-Arz.) 16M 179H 
u L . n A I I A C T I T I C A k km/ rrtkiDAikni 
INDORSEMENT Fee $ 
Attached to Policy No. M 076156 
Issued by 
IJWLIFE TITLE INSURANCE Company of Dallas 
The Company assures . . . 
(a) That by a valid assignment or assignments the beneficial interest under 
the mortgage referred to in paragraph 4 of ALTA Schedule A 
has been t ransferred to said Assured; 
FEDERAL HOME LOAN MORTGAGE CORPORATION 
(b) That there a r e no subsisting tax or assessment liens which a re prior to 
said mortgage except: 
(c) That there a r e no mat ters affecting the validity or priority of the lien of 
said mortgage, other than those shown in said policy, except: 
(d) That there a r e no United States tax liens or bankruptcy proceedings affec-
ting the title to said estate or interest shown by the public records, other 
than those shown in said policy, except: 
The Company hereby insures said Assured against any loss of principal, interest or other sums 
secured by said mortgage, which said Assured shall sustain in the event that the assurances herein 
shall prove to be incorrect . 
The total liability of the Company under said policy and any indorsements therein shall not exceed, 
in the aggregate, the face amount of said policy and costs which the Company is obligated under the 
conditions and stipulations thereof to pay. 
This indorsement is made a part of said policy and is subject to the schedules, conditions and stipu-
lations therein, except as modified by the provisions hereof. 
This indorsement is not to be construed as insuring the title to said estate or interest as of any later 
date than the date of said policy, except as herein expressly provided as to the subject matter hereof. 
Dated: July 13
 f 1983 , ? p 
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY of Dallas 
^^6^ 
President & Chief Executive OUicer 
Attest Senior Vice-President, Secretary end Treasurer 
Countersigned: 
(Conditions anJ^kpulations continued ana 
(e) In all cases where this policy p e r m i ^ ^ requires the Com-
pany to prosecute or provide for the defense of any action or 
proceeding, the insured hereunder shall secure to the Company 
the right to so prosecute or provide defense in such action or 
proceeding, and all appeals therein, and permit the Company to 
use, at its option, the name of such insured for such purpose. 
Whenever requested by the Company, such insured shall give the 
Company all reasonable aid in any such action or proceeding, in 
effecting settlement, securing evidence, obtaining witnesses, or 
prosecuting or defending such action or proceeding, and the Com-
pany shall reimburse such insured for any expense so incurred. 
Notice of Loss—Limitation of Action 
In addition to the notices required under paragraph 3(b) of these 
Conditions and Stipulations, a statement in writing of any loss or 
damage for which it is claimed the Company is liable under this 
policy shall be furnished to the Company within 90 days after such 
loss or damage shall have been determined and no right of action 
shall accrue to an insured claimant until 30 days after such state-
ment shall have been furnished. Failure to furnish such statement 
of loss or damage shall terminate any liability of the Company 
under this policy as to such loss or damage. 
5. Options to Pay or Otherwise Settle Claims 
The Company shall have the option to pay or otherwise settle 
for or in the name of an insured claimant any claim insured against 
or to terminate all liability and obligations of the Company here-
under by paying or tendering payment of the amount of insurance 
under this policy together with any costs, attorneys' fees and ex-
penses incurred up to the time of such payment or tender of pay-
ment by the insured claimant and authorized by the Company. In 
case loss or damage is claimed under this policy by an insured, the 
Company shall have the further option to purchase such indebted-
ness for the amount owing thereon together with all costs, 
attorneys' fees and expenses which the Company is obligated 
hereunder to pay. If the Company offers to purchase said indebted-
ness as herein provided, the owner of such indebtedness shall 
transfer and assign said indebtedness and the mortgage and any 
collateral securing the same to the Company upon payment there-
for as herein provided. 
6. Determination and Payment of Loss 
(a) The liability of the Company under this policy shall in no 
case exceed the least of: 
(i) the actual loss of the insured claimant; or 
(ii) the amount of insurance stated in Schedule A, or, if applicable, 
the amount of insurance as defined in paragraph 2(a) hereof; or 
(iii) the amount of the indebtedness secured by the insured 
mortgage as determined under paragraph 8 hereof, at the 
time the loss or damage insured against hereunder occurs, 
together with interest thereon. 
(b) The Company will pay, in addition to any loss insured against 
by this policy, all costs imposed upon an insured in litigation car-
ried on by the Company for such insured, and all costs, attorneys' 
fees and expenses in litigation carried on by such insured with the 
written authorization of the Company. 
(c) When liability has been definitely fixed in accordance with 
the conditions of this policy, the loss or damage shall be payable 
within 30 days thereafter. 
7. Limitation of Liability 
No claim shall arise or be maintainable under this policy (a) if 
the Company, after having received notice of an alleged defect, 
lien or encumbrance insured against hereunder, by litigation or 
otherwise, removes such defect, lien or encumbrance or estab-
lishes the title, or the lien of the insured mortgage, as insured, 
within a reasonable time after receipt of such notice; (b) in the 
event of litigation until there has been a final determination by a 
court of competent jurisdiction, and disposition of all appeals 
therefrom, adverse to the title or to the lien of the insured mort-
gage, as insured, as provided in paragraph 3 hereof; or (c) for 
liability voluntarily assumed by an insured in settling any claim or 
suit without Drior written consent of the Company. 
Reduction of Liability 
(a) Alt payments under this policy, except payments made for 
concluded from reverse ^ ^ of policy face) 
the acquisition of t i t l ^R said estate or interest as provided in 
paragraph 2(a) of these Conditions and Stipulations, shall not re-
duce pro tanto the amount of the insurance afforded hereunder 
except to the extent that such payments reduce the amount of the 
indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage. 
Payment in full by any person or voluntary satisfaction or release 
of the insured mortgage shall terminate all liability of the Company 
except as provided in paragraph 2(a) hereof. 
(b) The liability of the Company shall not be increased by addi-
tional principal indebtedness created subsequent to Date of Policy, 
except as to amounts advanced to protect the lien of the insured 
mortgage and secured thereby. 
No payment shall be made without producing this policy for en-
dorsement of such payment unless the policy be lost or destroyed, 
in which case proof of loss or destruction shall be furnished to the 
satisfaction of the Company. 
i.. Liability Noncumulative 
If the insured acquires title to the estate or interest in satisfac-
tion of the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage, or any 
part thereof, it is expressly understood that the amount of insur-
ance under this policy shall be reduced by any amount the Com-
pany may pay under any policy insuring a mortgage hereafter 
executed by an insured which is a charge or lien on the estate or 
interest described or referred to in Schedule A, and the amount so 
paid shall be deemed a payment under this policy. 
10 S u b r o g a t i o n U p o n P a y m e n t o r S e t t l e m e n t 
Whenever the Company shall have settled a claim under this 
policy, all right of subrogation shall vest in the Company unaf-
fected by any act of the insured claimant, except that the owner of 
the indebtedness secured by the insured mortgage may release or 
substitute the personal liability of any debtor or guarantor, or ex-
tend or otherwise modify the terms of payment, or release a por-
tion of the estate or interest from the lien of the insured mortgage, 
or release any collateral security for the indebtedness, provided 
such act occurs prior to receipt by the insured of notice of any 
claim of title or interest adverse to the title to the estate or interest 
or the priority of the lien of the insured mortgage and does not 
result in any loss of priority of the lien of the insured mortgage. 
The Company shall be subrogated to and be entitled to all rights 
and remedies which such insured claimant would have had against 
any person or property in respect to such claim had this policy not 
been issued, and if requested by the Company, such insured 
claimant shall transfer to the Company all rights and remedies 
against any person or property necessary in order to perfect such 
right of subrogation and shall permit the Company to use the 
name of such insured claimant in any transaction or litigation in-
volving such rights or remedies. If the payment does not cover the 
loss of such insured claimant, the Company shall be subrogated to 
such rights and remedies in the proportion which said payment 
bears to the amount of said loss, but such subrogation shall be in 
subordination to the insured mortgage. If loss of priority should 
result from any act of such insured claimant, such act shall not 
void this policy, but the Company, in that event, shall be required 
to pay only that part of any losses insured against hereunder which 
shall exceed the amount, if any, lost to the Company by reason of 
the impairment of the right of subrogation. 
L iabi l i ty L i m i t e d t o th is Po l icy 
This instrument together with all endorsements and other instru-
ments, if any, attached hereto by the Company is the entire policy 
and contract between the insured and the Company. 
Any claim of loss or damage, whether or not based on negli 
gence, and which arises out of the status of the lien_of the insurec 
mortgage or of the title to the estate or interest covered hereby 
or any action asserting such claim, shall be restricted to the pro-
visions and conditions and stipulations of this policy. 
No amendment of or endorsement to this policy can be made 
except by writing endorsed hereon or attached hereto signed b\ 
either the President, a Vice President, the Secretary, an Assistam 
Secretary, or .validating officer or authorized signatory «f th< 
Company. 
Notices, Where Sent 
All notices and statements permitted or required to be given 
OFFICERS 
Robert 0. Oorociak President and 
Chief Executive Officer 
Drake McKee Consultant 
Robert Michael Clark . . . .Senior Vice President, 
Secretary and General Counsel 
Eugene L Sheppard . . . . Senior Vice President 
Harry A. Fisher . , . Vice President and Treasurer 
John Gray Vice President and Controller 
Donna Comstock Vice President 
Tess Goad Vice President 
Catherine Gray Vice President 
Curtis W. Gustafson Vice President 
Sidney W. Terry Vice President 
One of 
The Nation's 
Oldest 
Title Insurance 
Companies 
Title Insurance throughout 
Texas 
Alabama 
Arkansas 
Arizona 
California 
Colorado 
Georgia 
Idaho 
Louisiana 
Mississippi 
Missouri 
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Nevada
 { 
New Mexico 
Oklahoma 
Utah 
Established in 1906 
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Commitment 
for Title Insurance 
y PLAINTIFF'S 
* EXHIBIT 
' l^ iT : 
ADDENDUM N o . 3 
USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas, Dallas. Texas, A Texas Corporation, herein called the Company, 
for valuable consideration, hereby commits to issue its policy or policies of title insurance, as identified in Sched-
ule A, in favor of the proposed Insured named in Schedule A, as owner or mortgagee of the estate or interest 
covered hereby in the land described or referred to in Schedule A, upon payment of the premiums and charges 
therefor; all subject to the provisions of Schedules A and B and to the Conditions and Stipulations hereof. 
This Commitment shall be effective only when the identity of the proposed Insured and the amount of the 
policy or policies committed for have been inserted in Schedule A hereof by the Company, either at the 
time of issuance of this Commitment or by subsequent endorsement. 
This Commitment is preliminary to the issuance of such policy or policies of title insurance and all liability 
and obligations hereunder shall cease and terminate six (6) months after the effective date hereof or when 
the policy or policies committed for shall issue, whichever first occurs, provided that the failure to issue such 
policy or policies is not the fault of the Company. The Commitment shall not be valid or binding until 
countersigned by an authorized officer or agent. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, USLIFE Title Insurance Company of Dallas has caused this Commitment to be signed 
and sealed as of the effective date of Commitment shown in Schedule A. 
USLIFE TITLE INSURANCE Company of Dallas 
President & Chief Executive Officer 
/&Juj>Aie/^#&J^ 
Attest: Se/iior Vice-President, Secretary and General Counsel 
^t- A- 'ULt-C ^-j.--
Authorized Countersignature 
S MOUNTAIN VIEW TITLE %? 
.racocw GO. r 
1117 East Country Hills Dr. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
(801) 479-1170-1171-1172 
(801) 544-4245 
AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION COPYRIGHT 1971 (REV.) 
Prepared for: VALLEY MORTGAGE 
Attn: Paul Thurston 
SCHEDULE A 
Inquiries should be directed 
GFNo. D 2643 to K e v i n P a r k i n s o n 
1. Effective date: A p r i l 1 5 , 1983 @ 8 :00 a . m . 
2. Policy or Policies to be issued: Amount 
(a) • ALTA Owners Policy — Form —1970 $ 
Proposed Insured: 
(b) S ALTA Standard Loan Policy, Coverage —1970 $ 1 0 1 , 5 0 0 . 0 0 
(435 .00 ) 
Proposed Insured: VALLEY MORTGAGE 
3. The estate or interest in the land described or referred to in this Commitment and covered herein is: 
Fee S i m p l e 
4. Title to said estate or interest in said land is at the effective date hereof vested in: 
F. KENT NANCE and PATRICIA J. NANCE, his wife, as joint tenants. 
5. The land referred to in this Commitment is located in the County of Summit 
State of U t a h and described as follows: 
BEGINNING 173.55 feet North and 1466.1 feet East of the Quarter Section Corner 
on the West line of Section 17, Township 3 South, Range 7 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian, and running thence North 185.97 feet, more or less, to the South 
boundary line of State Road right-of-way; thence along said boundary South 69° 
59f East 106.4 feet; thence South 148.78 feet; thence West 100 feet to the 
place of beginning. 
ALSO BEING KNOWN and designated as Lot 3 of KAMP KILL RARE LOTS, according to 
the official plat thereof on file in the office of the County Recorder of 
Summit County. 
TOGETHER WITH a right-of-way 20 feet wide being 10 feet on either side of "the 
following described centerline, being on a point on the South Quarter boundary 
line of State Road right-of-way 632 feet North and 856.1 feet East of the 
quarter section corner on West line of said Section 17; thence South 468.5 
feet East 1080 feet; thence North 40 feet, more or less, to the State Road 
right-of-way. 
AMERICAN LAND TITLE ASSOCIATION COPYRIGHT 1971 (REV.) 
SCHEDULE A 
SCHEDULE B-ll 
Schedule B of the policy or policies to be issued will contain exceptions to the following matters unless the 
same are disposed of to the satisfaction of the Company: 
1. Defects, liens, encumbrances, adverse claims or other matters, if any, created, first appearing in the 
public records or attaching subsequent to the effective date hereof but prior to the date the pro-
posed Insured acquires for value of record the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by 
this Commitment. 
2. Rights or claims of parties in possession not shown by the public records. 
3. Any discrepancies, conflicts in boundary lines, shortage in area, encroachments, overlapping of im-
provements, or other boundary or location disputes. 
4. Any roadway or easement, similar or dissimilar, on, under, over, or across said property, or any part 
thereof not shown by the public records. 
5. Any liens for labor, services, or material, or claims to same which are not shown by the public 
records. 
6. Any titles or rights asserted by anyone including, but not limited to, persons, corporations, govern-
ments, or other entities, to tidelands, or lands comprising the shores or bottoms of navigable 
streams, lakes, bays, oceans, or gulf, or lands beyond the line of the harbor or bulkhead lines estab-
lished or changed by the United States Government or riparian rights, if any. 
7. Any unpatented mining claims; reservations or exceptions in patents or in acts authorizing the is-
suance thereof; water rights, claims or titles to water. 
8. Community property, dower, courtesy or homestead rights, if any, of any spouse of the insured. 
9. The lien of all taxes and assessments for the year 19 , and thereafter. 
10. Restrictive covenants affecting the property above described. 
11. Taxes for the year 1982 were paid in the amount of $338.66. Taxes for 
the year 1983 are now accruing as a lien but are not yet due or payable, 
SERIAL NUMBER: KK-3 
12.^ Said property is included within the boundaries of Weber Basin Water 
•:{ //Conservancy District/ South Summit Fire Protection District, South Summit 
"Cemetery Maintenance District, Special District #7, and is subject to any 
^charges and assessments levied by them as a result of services provided. 
/ 
//13\ Rights of way for any roadsf ditches, canals or transmission lines now 
/ ^e$cisting over, under or across said property. 
Any and all outstanding oil, gas, mining and mineral rights, etc., 
Q? together with the right of the proprietor of a vein or lode to extract 
his ore therefrom should the same be found to penetrate or intersect 
the premises, and the right of ingress and egress for the use of said 
rights. 
14. WARRANTY DEED 
Dated: January 29, 1953 
Deeded Tb: MASON CONSTRUCTION, INC. 
Book: U Page: 332 
"As a part of the consideration for this Deed, the Grantee agrees not 
to use the above described property to conduct a business, trade or 
manufacture of any sort or nature, no buildings shall be erected thereon 
except one private dwelling house with a garage appurtenant thereto. Any 
violation of the above mentioned restrictions shall cause this Deedjto 
become null and void." 
y 
DEED OF TRUST tfL fe/'0'•f'3 
Dated: September 18, 1981 * / s/<^£
 fO£) 
Amount: $97,000.00 Plus Interest tAJj - 7 ^ ' / ' $<& 
Trustor: F. KENT NANCE and PATRICIA JEANNE NANCE ^ ' ^ 
Beneficiary: FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH yUCC^L--^Q^fi'i 5^3-5 
Trustee: SECURITY TITLE COMPANY -^ ~ • . ., -»,/ ^p//-)~ 2>? ' 
Recorded: September 22, 1981 2 ^ > / ^<^~&QC/7*/? - /4 
Entry No: 183798 - ^ - ^ - ^ ^ ^ >-J ~ 
Book: M198 Page: 69j* .^ ^ ^ * W ' <*C7 
DEED OF TRUST ' <*[ M ^ ' /> 
Dated: September 24, 1981 /.^ 
Amount: $57,147.00 
Trustor: F. KENT NANCE and PATRICIA J. NANCE 
Beneficiary: THE CITIZENS BANK 
Trustee: SECURITY TITLE COMPANY 
Recorded: October 8f 1981 
Entry No: 184407 
Book: M200 Page: 312 
JUDGEMENTS were checked against the names of the following and none 
were found to be of record: 
F. KENT NANCE 
PATRICIA J. NANCE 
CONDITIONS AND STIPULATIONS 
1. The term "mortgage," when used herein, shall include deed of trust, trust deed, or other security instrument. 
2. If the proposed Insured has or acquires actual knowledge of any defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim 
or other matter affecting the estate or interest or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment other 
than those shown in Schedule B hereof, and shall fail to disclose such knowledge to the Company in 
writing, the Company shall be relieved from liability for any loss or damage resulting from any act of 
reliance hereon to the extent the Company is prejudiced by failure to so disclose such knowledge. If the 
proposed Insured shall disclose such knowledge to the Company, or if the Company otherwise acquires 
actual knowledge of any such defect, lien, encumbrance, adverse claim or other matter, the Company at 
its option may amend Schedule B of this Commitment accordingly, but such amendment shall not relieve 
the Company from liability previously incurred pursuant to paragraph 3 of these Conditions and Stipulations. 
3. Liability of the Company under this Commitment shall be only to the named proposed Insured and such 
parties included under the definition of Insured in the form of policy or policies committed for and only 
for actual loss incurred in reliance hereon in undertaking in good faith (a) to comply with the requirements 
hereof, or (b) to eliminate exceptions shown in Schedule B, or (c) to acquire or create the estate or interest 
or mortgage thereon covered by this Commitment. In no event shall such liability exceed the amount stated 
in Schedule A for the policy or policies committed for and such liability is subject to the insuring provisions, 
the Conditions and Stipulations, and the Exclusions from Coverage of the form of policy or policies committed 
for in favor of the proposed Insured which are hereby incorporated by reference and are made a part 
of this Commitment except as expressly modified herein. 
4. Any action or actions or rights of action that the proposed Insured may have or may bring against the 
Company arising out of the status of the title to the estate or interest or the status of the mortgage thereon 
covered by this Commitment must be based on and are subject to the provisions of this Commitment. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 22d day of January, 1988, 
I caused four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT VALLEY BANK AND TRUST COMPANY to be hand delivered to 
the following counsel of record: 
Steven H. Gunn 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main St. #400 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
y for Appel1 ant 
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